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_____ Accession No. _____

[illegible], The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.

FACTORS RELATED TO THE COLLABORATION AND RESISTANCE BEHAVIOR OF U.S. ARMY PW's IN KOREA—Julius Segal

Technical Report 33, Dec 56, 116 pp, illus, tables (Contract No. DA-44-109-qm-650) DA Proj 095-85-001, Unclassified Report

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by

Julius Segal

Approved
June 1956

Joseph R. Hochstim
JOSEPH R. HOCHSTIM
Director of Research
Psychological Warfare Division

Meredith P. Crawford
MEREDITH P. CRAWFORD
Director
Human Resources Research Office

The George Washington University
HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH OFFICE
operating under contract with
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Technical Report 33
December 1956

Copy _____
Task PSYFREE

COMPOSITION OF THE RESEARCH TEAM

The Task leader was Julius Segal. Members of the research team were Roy Jones, Raymond C. Kline, Milton Kovner, and Grace S. Malakoff.

The PSYFREE research was conducted while Dr. Carleton F. Scofield was Director of Research, Psychological Warfare Division.

Published
December 1956
by
The George Washington University
HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH OFFICE
Post Office Box 3596
Washington 7, D.C.

Distributed under the authority of the
Chief of Research and Development
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D.C.

1. Problem:

To aid in the development of an Army indoctrination and training program designed to provide captured soldiers with appropriate defenses against Communist exploitation

2. Background:

The Korean conflict demonstrated that the Communists will try to exploit captured American troops for psychological warfare purposes. The experiences and behavior of U.S. Army PW's in Korea indicated a need for training measures designed to thwart the enemy's exploitative techniques.

3. Procedure:

a. The 3,323 repatriated Army PW's were classified on the basis of their conduct as prisoners. The three groups, based upon Department of Army action taken or pending in each soldier's case, were:

Participators (e.g., those recommended for court martial), 15 per cent; Resisters (e.g., those decorated for meritorious behavior as PW's), 5 per cent; Middle (e.g., those concerning whom there was conflicting evidence), 80 per cent.

b. A sample of 579 PW's, including all of the Resisters, one-half of the Participators, and one-thirteenth of the Middle Men, was selected for study. The three groups were compared with regard to their backgrounds, experiences, attitudes, personalities, and prison camp behavior.

4. Conclusions:

a. Participation with the enemy was seldom the result of abuse and mistreatment; it was the Resister who bore the brunt of the captor's pressures.

b. The behavior of the Participators was opportunistic in nature; the behavior of the Resisters was not.

c. Participators cooperated with the enemy primarily in order to eliminate the threat of mistreatment and to receive the benefits of preferential treatment.

d. Materialistic and not ideological considerations were paramount in the participation behavior of Army PW's.

e. There was little cohesiveness, *esprit de corps*, or mutual concern among the Army PW's in Korea.

5. Recommendations:

a. That the specific findings of this study be incorporated in troop orientation programs designed to inform soldiers regarding the facts of PW life under the Communists.

b. That soldiers be taught:

(1) The specific ways in which acts of participation aid the enemy;

(2) The necessity for unity and organization among PW's;

(3) Skills required to activate and operate PW organizations designed to implement and encourage resistance;

(4) Escape, survival and hygienic measures;

(5) The mission of a PW.

c. That simulated captor pressures be considered as a training technique by which the prisoner's susceptibility to threats of mistreatment might be reduced.

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FACTORS RELATED TO THE COLLABORATION AND RESISTANCE BEHAVIOR OF U.S. ARMY PW'S IN KOREA

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

PROBLEM

The Korean conflict clearly revealed that captured troops serve the Communists as a powerful instrument for furthering psychological warfare goals. The enemy attempted with some success to use PW's in Korea in an organized propaganda campaign to discredit the United States and United Nations in the Far East. The problem faced by the U.S. Army in anticipating future hostilities in which the Communists might again capture large numbers of our military forces is intensified by the fact that 93 per cent of the troops captured by the Communists in Korea were Army personnel. The seriousness of the problem posed by Communist exploitation of prisoners can not, moreover, be measured merely in terms of the number of troops likely to be taken prisoner, or even of the smaller number who would actually contribute significantly to enemy psywar activities. In Communist hands all PW's are potential idea-weapons, and the successful exploitation of any one man may damage our nation's cause.

The experiences and behavior of U.S. troops captured in Korea revealed a need by the Army for measures designed to offset the enemy's planned program of PW exploitation. Specifically, the need was recognized for a program of indoctrination and training which would provide Army troops, in the event of their capture, with appropriate defenses against Communist captors. As a first step in the development of such a program, this research was directed toward providing answers to the following questions:

(1) What were the goals of the Communist captor in Korea, and by what methods did he go about achieving them?

- (a) For what specific purposes and with what success did the Communists exploit Army PW's?
- (b) Under what conditions and by what methods did the captor pursue his program?
- (c) What were the responses of the PW's to the captor and to the environment of captivity?

(2) What were the factors—including civilian and military background characteristics, attitudes, personality traits, internment experiences, and internment behavior—which differentiated those Army PW's who resisted Communist exploitation in Korea from those who participated in the captor's program?[1]

[1]PW's who collaborated with the enemy are referred to in this report as "Participators" and their behavior as "participation."

The original mission of this research included the development of techniques for using enemy prisoners of war in our own psywar operations, with emphasis upon deriving information which would be useful in U.S. military psychological warfare planning and operations. At the conclusion of the Korean conflict, however, and with repatriation of American PW's, the emphasis was placed upon the development of defenses among our own troops in order to minimize the potency of Communist propaganda efforts in a future conflict.

PROCEDURES

The Sample

A total of 6,656 Army troops were taken prisoner during the Korean conflict. One-half of these men died in captivity, most of them during the early phases of the war, before the Chinese Communists began their planned program of PW exploitation. This study is concerned only with those 3,323 Army PW's who were repatriated in the prisoner exchanges after hostilities ended. The Army studied the personal histories and prison camp conduct of all these returned prisoners in determining what action, if any, should be taken in each soldier's case. On the basis of these Army determinations, the researchers could place each returning PW in one of three Groups:

PARTICIPATORS (15%)—Court-martial and dishonorable discharge cases, plus those who would have fallen in either category had they not already been discharged from the military service;

MIDDLE (80%)—PW's concerning whom the Army had compiled little or no derogatory information, or conflicting information;

RESISTERS (5%)—PW's decorated or recommended for decoration as a result of their meritorious behavior in captivity, plus those who committed at least two distinct acts of resistance in internment and against whom there was no derogatory information.

The sample chosen from these Groups numbered 579 cases, including roughly one-half of the Participators (238 PW's), one-thirteenth of the Middle Men (203 PW's), and all of the Resisters (138 PW's). Within the Participator and Middle Groups, a stratified-random sampling technique was used. The sample was selected to reflect the same proportions of ranks, races, months of military service, months in captivity, and principal places of internment as were represented among all the returning PW's.

The Data

The basic data were drawn from dossiers containing transcripts of interrogations of returning PW's conducted by the Intelligence Branch of the Army. These dossiers—having been compiled for purposes of intelligence and not for research—were not uniform, either in quantity, quality, or substance of information. Nevertheless, by systematically codifying the data, over 300 items of information were secured,

describing the backgrounds, prison experiences, and behavior of the PW's, as well as the techniques employed by the captor in his attempts at prisoner exploitation. Over-all assessments of the PW's on important aspects of their internment were derived through the use of 27 rating scales, which served as a vehicle for summarizing relevant dossier information in a form amenable to special statistical analyses.

Medical histories of the PW's in internment and medical evaluations made immediately after repatriation were obtained from The Surgeon General's Office. Civilian and military background data were derived from the prisoners' Army personnel forms, obtained from The Adjutant General's Office.

GENERALIZABILITY OF THE RESULTS

The potential utility of this research lies in application of its conclusions in the solution of Army problems arising out of the possibility of prisoner-of-war experiences in the future. It is important therefore that the following points be kept in mind in making generalizations from the results of this study:

(1) This study applies only to Army personnel and their experiences as PW's, and not to members of other military branches.

(2) The results are applicable only to PW experiences in the hands of Communist captors and, although the history of PW exploitation by Communists presents a fairly consistent pattern, it should be remembered that this study deals only with an Oriental Communist enemy.

(3) This study concerns PW's captured in a unique kind of war. As members of a little-understood U.N. "police action" in which ultimate victory was not pursued, the motivation of troops in Korea may have been relatively lower than that of soldiers fighting a large-scale war. In addition, background characteristics among the Army population at a time of full mobilization may differ from those in the relatively small-scale Korean effort.

(4) All of the PW's may not have been able to perceive accurately all of the events in the prison compounds, or to recollect them faultlessly during their post-repatriation interviews.

(5) The basic data for this study were collected under circumstances vulnerable to the introduction of bias. In his interrogation, each PW was aware that the information he gave might be used in the administrative handling of his case; this appears to raise a question as to the validity of the data. There is evidence, however, to support the reasonable hypothesis that the Participator PW was more defensive when interrogated than the Resister, and we can therefore assume that the bias incurred is in most instances one which minimizes the differences found between these two Groups.

In spite of these limitations, the data for this study are considered to provide the best information available concerning the experience and behavior of American PW's in Communist hands. Because the direction of at least one bias introduced in the collection of the data can be gauged, the results may be interpreted with considerable confidence.

FINDINGS

The Army PW's

Following are some of the characteristics of the Army PW's who returned from Korea:

(1) Their average age at capture was 21 years.

(2) The average PW had a ninth-grade education.

(3) Five per cent were officers, 38 per cent were non-commissioned officers, and 57 per cent were enlisted men below the rank of sergeant.

(4) Seventy-five per cent were members of the Regular Army, 10 per cent were from the Enlisted Reserve and National Guard, and 15 per cent were draftees.

(5) Eighty-five per cent had over three years of military service.

(6) Fifty per cent had less than one month of foreign service prior to Korea.

(7) Eighty-four per cent had no combat service prior to Korea.

(8) One per cent had been PW's before.

The Enemy's Objectives

(1) The Communist captor viewed the prisoners primarily as a rich source of potent propaganda materials.

(2) By means of a heavy barrage of indoctrination, the captor attempted to convert Army PW's to Communism.

(a) Ninety-seven per cent of the returned PW's were subjected to enemy indoctrination during internment.

(b) Virtually all were given indoctrination lectures by the captor. In addition, 83 per cent were required to attend group study periods, 43 per cent smaller discussion groups and conferences, and 27 per cent public gatherings called by the captor. Subsidiary indoctrination methods included discussion groups conducted by the prisoners themselves (9%), voluntary study groups (11%), and personal individual contacts (4%). The captor used also such "training aids" as propaganda movies (seen by 25%), plays, posters, pictures, exhibits, charts, and recordings.

(c) The major current of thought stressed in indoctrination was that of the social and economic merits of Communism as against the "sins" of American capitalism.

(d) Virtually all of the returned PW's had been exposed to enemy-sponsored newspapers or magazines, and 85 per cent heard Communist radio broadcasts. In contrast, only one-tenth of the PW's received non-Communist news of any type during their internment, and over half of this consisted of innocuous sports and local news clippings sent in letters from home.

(e) Fifteen per cent of the returned PW's had been given suggestions for Communist-oriented activities to be carried on after their release. Primarily these were suggestions for joining Communist organizations and reading Communist publications.

(3) The Communists attempted to extract valuable military information from the PW's through interrogation.

(a) All but 3 per cent of the repatriated PW's had been interrogated to some extent by their captors.

(b) Ninety-one per cent had written autobiographies as part of the interrogation procedures. In addition, half were questioned about Army Tables of Organization and Equipment, one-fourth about military equipment and supplies, 15 per cent about Army tactics and strategy, and 13 per cent about political affiliations and personal attitudes.

(c) In formal interrogation, less than one-half of one per cent of the PW's had been asked only their name, rank, and serial number.

The Enemy's Success

(1) Over all, 70 per cent of the returned PW's had contributed to some degree—wittingly or unwittingly—to the Communists' psychological warfare efforts in Korea. The following were the major contributions made:

Signing Communist propaganda petitions (39%)
Making propaganda recordings (22%)
Writing articles for enemy newspapers (11%)
Writing propaganda petitions (5%)
Circulating petitions (5%)
Performing full-time propaganda duties, e.g., as cartoonist or writer (16%)

(2) Eighty-eight per cent of the returned PW's accepted no part of Communism; among those who did, more than half can be described as having only a mild affinity toward the captor's ideology.

(3) The present study provides no data indicating the kinds or amounts of military information the enemy received from our men. This can only be guessed from the fact that many prisoners could not see the value of interrogation information for the enemy.

The Enemy's Techniques

In implementing his program of PW exploitation, the enemy used three major techniques:

(1) The Communist captor instituted a system of rewards and punishments and played upon the natural tendencies to seek pleasure and avoid pain. Collaboration resulted in the rewards of preferential treatment; resistance frequently meant physical abuse and mistreatment.

(2) The captor sought to divide and conquer the PW's. In addition to denying the PW's their normal sources of leadership, the Communists encouraged divisiveness and suspicion among the PW's, primarily by seeking and rewarding informers among them.

(3) The idea-environment in which the PW's lived was strictly controlled. The enemy prevented the PW's from receiving news from friendly sources (e.g., through radios, newspapers, letters).

Interrelationships Among the PW's

The Army PW's in Korea showed a marked lack of esprit de corps, cohesiveness, and mutual concern.

(1) Ten per cent of the PW's informed on a fellow at least once during their internment.

(2) Over a third of the PW's showed little or no concern and compassion for their fellows in internment, and only 13 per cent showed a strong concern.

(3) Half of the PW's never encouraged another PW to resist, and only 10 per cent gave a great deal of such encouragement.

(4) One-fourth of the returning PW's report being aware of the outright mistreatment of prisoners by their fellows, including beatings resulting in death.

(5) Only 16 per cent of all PW's were affiliated with a prison camp organization of any type during captivity.

Differences Between Participators and Resisters

(1) Among the acts committed by large proportions of the Participators, and found only rarely among Resisters, were the following: informing on fellow PW's, signing and circulating propaganda petitions, writing articles for enemy newspapers, making propaganda recordings, and holding full-time propaganda jobs. Among the acts found more frequently among the Resisters than among the Participators were the following: engaging in escape activities, aiding others in escape, making anti-Communist speeches, and beating up PW's suspected of cooperating with the enemy.

(2) Few significant differences in background were found between Participators and Resisters. The Participators were of lower intelligence than Resisters, and a higher proportion of the Resisters had been decorated by the Army prior to Korea.

(3) Resisters, because they yielded less readily, were interrogated more extensively and intensively than were Participators.

(4) Participators received more indoctrination than Resisters, largely as a result of their volunteering for more.

(5) Forty-five per cent of the Participators accepted Communism to some degree; of these, almost half accepted little. Among the Resisters, there were only a few isolated cases of prisoners who came out of internment sympathetic toward Communism in any degree, and all of these were only mildly so.

(6) The Participators received virtually all of the preferential treatment given by the captor.

(7) The Resisters received most of the pressure, including threats and abuses, meted out by the enemy.

(8) The Participators were more prone than the Resisters to bend to the captor's wishes in the face of inducements of preferential treatment and threats of mistreatment.

(9) The Resisters showed more concern and compassion for their fellows than did Participators.

(10) The Participators came back from Korea in better physical health than Resisters; psychologically, however, a greater proportion of the Participators came back with neurotic symptoms.

The Middle Group

In the following ways the Middle Group differed from both Participators and Resisters:

(1) The Middle Men did less: Like the Participators, they seldom performed acts of resistance; like the Resisters, they seldom committed acts of participation.

(2) They got less, of either of the captor's "rewards": Like the Participators, they were seldom the objects of pressure; like the Resisters, they seldom received preferential treatment.

(3) Members of the Middle Group joined camp organizations less often than their fellows and were more often alone than with others during captivity.

(4) Middle Men were less educated, less intelligent, and "greener" soldiers than either Participators or Resisters.

(5) A smaller proportion of Middle Men were married, and they came into the Army less frequently than their fellows with backgrounds of entertainment talent and sports activity.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The training information provided by this study is essentially of two types: (1) descriptions of PW life under the Communists and (2) characteristics which differentiate the Participators from the Resisters. The first type may be utilized in Army orientation courses designed to inform troops (e.g., via lecture or film) what to expect from the captor should they become prisoners of war. The utilization of the second is more challenging; it implies, for the most part, the direct training of basic skills, and the altering of traits of behavior among soldiers who, in the event of capture, would not act as Resisters in internment. These two aspects will be distinguished here under the heading of "Orientation" and "Training" although, of course, troop orientation is itself in no small measure a training procedure.

Orientation

Any or all portions of this study which describe PW experiences at the hands of the Communist captor could conceivably serve as content for the orientation of troops who themselves may become PW's. Indicating the specific content of such an orientation course would of necessity involve cataloguing all findings of a descriptive nature derived in this research. To the extent that these findings offer the best prediction we can make of the environment of future incarcerations under the Communists, "potential" PW's should be made aware of all of them. Rather than as a restatement of all the pertinent findings, however, the

following is intended as a guide to those portions of this study which contain elements of information of potentially the greatest value in the design of orientation procedures.

In orientation courses intended to aid potential PW's in resisting their Communist captors, Army troops should be made aware especially of the following facts about prisoner-of-war life under the Communists:

(1) The Communists' interrogation procedures

(a) The PW will be asked for autobiographical data which appear innocuous enough, but which the captor will use as a lever for coercing the PW's into collaboration.

(b) The PW must expect always that he will be asked much more than his name, rank, and serial number; primarily he will be interrogated regarding Army Tables of Organization and Equipment, and tactics and strategy.

(c) PW's identified as Intelligence personnel can expect to be interrogated more extensively and intensively than their fellows.

(d) The captor will use more threats than actual abuse in interrogation, and not all threats will materialize; there is less than a 50-50 chance that a resistive PW who is threatened in interrogation will also be abused.

(e) The greater the PW's resistance in interrogation, the longer and more intensive he can expect his interrogation to be.

(2) The Communists' indoctrination procedures

(a) A resistive PW has a 50-50 chance of escaping threat and abuse in indoctrination; if he is threatened, his chances of escaping abuse are one in four.

(b) Signs of cooperation in the captor's indoctrination program will result in the "invitation" to attend special indoctrination sessions voluntarily.

(c) The greater the PW's resistance, the less extensive and intensive will be his indoctrination experience.

(d) As part of the camp routine of activities, the captor will require virtually all PW's to attend indoctrination lectures. Group discussions and study periods will also serve as primary vehicles for indoctrination; public gatherings and personal, individual contacts will be encountered less frequently.

(e) The captor can be expected to supplement the prisoner's indoctrination diet with movies, books, newspapers, periodicals, recordings, plays, and various graphic exhibits.

(f) Prisoners will probably find the captor's ideological persuasions most effective when presented in lectures, through personal contacts, and through books.

(g) In his indoctrination efforts, the captor will stress the economic advantages of Communism as against the exploitation of the worker (and soldier) under the American democratic system. He will attempt to make the PW feel that he is the innocent victim of the few Americans who represent the "ruling class" and who profit from the

wars which the "little man" must fight. He will glorify Communist leaders as heroes and portray American leaders as villains.

(h) The PW will find himself in an environment in which his information is derived from "one way" news sources. He should be made aware that under such circumstances it is natural for even the most intelligent individual to begin doubting the correctness of his own attitudes and even of the facts he has known. When a person has been deprived of normal stimuli for a long enough period, he becomes highly suggestible and can begin to doubt even his own senses.

(3) The Communists' treatment of PW's

(a) In effect, the captor can be expected to "make a deal" with the PW's. Those who wish to better their lot and live with increased comfort and freedom need only to do the captor's bidding; those who refuse can frequently expect to be punished and mistreated. To resist means not only to give up the rewards of preferential treatment but to accept the real possibility of reprisals.

(b) A resistive PW has an even chance of going through captivity without being mistreated by the captor. He should be prepared to expect primarily various forms of incarceration and physical abuse, but also hard labor, deprivation of food, drink, clothing, and adequate medical care, and exposure to the elements.

(4) Acts of participation sought by the captor

(a) Primarily, the captor will attempt to use PW's as tools for propaganda. Troops should be familiarized with the potency of psychological warfare as a weapon, and made to realize that the act of signing a petition or making a recording has far-reaching consequences in terms of the enemy's success in his psychological warfare campaigns. Ten PW names affixed to a petition may not mean that this propaganda "bullet" is 10 times more effective than it would be with only one name, but there can be little doubt that its effectiveness will be increased with every additional name. It is as if the PW's served as laborers on an assembly line making weapons for the enemy; each additional part provided raises the value of the weapon.

(b) The captor will seek to extract from the PW's the following contributions to the enemy's propaganda machine: making recordings (in which the propaganda line is masked and to which the PW is easily lured by the fact that the messages are intended as greetings to home); writing newspaper and magazine articles; writing petitions; signing petitions (which may appear to PW's less harmful than they really are, yet for which the captor is willing to exert considerable threat and abuse); circulating petitions; doing full-time propaganda jobs (e.g., as cartoonist or writer), in which the PW has only to demonstrate his willingness to work "conscientiously" in order to gain increased personal freedom and status.

(c) The captor will encourage and reward informing on fellow PW's. Quite apart from its other implications, no other act is so valuable to the enemy in his attempts to split and demoralize the

PW's. If a prisoner wishes to be friendly with the captor—short of informing—this, too, will be encouraged through walks or informal talks. By these means the PW is carried ever further from any emotional tie he might have with his fellow prisoners.

(d) Confessions to misdeeds are required by the captor not as a propaganda vehicle, but rather as a technique to implement collaboration. PW's should recognize that their confessions are intended by the captor to bring about apathy and abject support of the camp regime. The act itself does not appear punitive, yet it is potentially destructive of the PW's spirit.

(5) Avenues of resistance

(a) Resistance can be defined in large measure as avoiding or refusing to accede to the demands made by the captor. Troops should be made to know which of these demands are most meaningful to the Communists and therefore most destructive of our country's security. At one level, for example, are the acts of informing or writing and signing petitions, and at quite another is the confession by a PW that he is, in fact, a Resister.

(b) In addition, the soldier should be made aware of the positive ways in which he can resist the captor—escaping from camp, aiding others in their escape attempts, taking the initiative in neutralizing the captor's indoctrination efforts among those PW's who appear to be weakened by the enemy's persuasions, activating and joining resistance organizations, observing the essentials of physical hygiene and aiding others to do so, or encouraging fellows to resist.

(c) Abusive retaliation against individuals who seem to be cooperating with the enemy does not appear to be an effective mode of resistance, nor are the meaningless anti-social acts (e.g., striking or cursing guards, or refusing to comply with camp regulations) which result in needless retaliation by the captor. It is highly questionable whether the price in punishment paid for the latter is worth the effort.

(6) The importance of group cohesiveness

(a) It is important for the soldier to realize that his resistance potential can be enhanced through affiliation with organizations whose mission it is to resist the enemy. This is as true in captivity as it is in combat; probably nothing is more threatening to the captor than the possibility of unified, concentrated resistance on the part of PW's.

(b) Even in the face of lures, PW's should be aware of the value of their sharing a feeling of mutual concern with their fellows. Such esprit and group identification is no less important in prison than it is in the field. A "dog eat dog" attitude among PW's is exactly what the captor would wish to develop.

(c) The captor will follow the usual procedure of separating officers from men, with the special goal of discouraging organized activity against him; he will also attempt to breed suspicion among the PW's whenever possible.

(d) PW's should be prepared to encourage their fellows to resist the captor. A feeling of aloneness is not conducive to resistance.

(e) PW organizations which represent no more than cliques designed to hoard food and abuse suspected collaborators can accomplish little in the battle with the captor. The central, unifying purpose of PW organizations should be to resist the captor and help other PW's in achieving this goal.

(f) PW organizations can function most effectively only at a covert level; a PW who is known to be active in resistance organizations can expect to be pressured somewhat more than others, and to have his organization broken by the captor.

(7) The necessity for the will to survive

(a) PW's who lose the will to live cannot be considered Resisters. The PW must be prepared to cope psychologically with the severe deprivations associated with prisoner-of-war life. He must not give up on himself or on his ability to survive. In the face of prison camp conditions, he must learn to practice (and help others to practice) the basic rituals of physical hygiene.

Training

Quite apart from orienting troops about prisoner-of-war life under the Communists, what direct training measures can the Army design to provide defenses against PW exploitation among those troops captured by the enemy? As indicated in the statement of the problem of this research, the primary mission of this study was simply to identify the traits and behaviors which differentiate the Resister from the Participator. Only on bases other than this study—including further research—can we conclude with certainty whether those traits associated with resistance are trainable and, if so, by what means. The results of this study do serve, however, to bring the "training for resistance" problem into sharper focus, and to isolate those areas which deserve the greatest attention. The following discussion is intended to highlight the major conclusions reached, with special reference to the immediate training needs of the Army and to the directions indicated for further research.

Background Characteristics

In general, background characteristics do not serve to differentiate Resister and Participator PW's nearly so well as do behavioral traits evidenced in internment. For purposes of training, those few items of background which do differentiate resistive and cooperative PW's appear to offer little immediate utility.

Opportunism vs. Concern for Others

The single factor which serves most clearly to differentiate the Participator from the Resister is the degree to which each behaved in an opportunistic fashion. The Participator was easy prey for the

lures of preferential treatment; the Resister was not tempted. The Participator was motivated by self-interest and showed little concern or compassion for his fellows; the Resister showed greater concern for his fellows and thwarted the captor at considerable cost to himself.

Opportunistic behavior and a disregard for the welfare of others imply a whole complex of personality traits and a value system which the Army would be hard pressed to alter. It is hardly conceivable that—given even the most liberal training period—the Army could transform men predisposed to behaving only in their own self-interest into soldiers who behave in the interests of others, especially in a PW situation in which the "extra bowl of rice" takes on an entirely new meaning. Such transformations are rare enough in the process of psychotherapy, let alone in the training of masses of men. As a matter of fact, we must admit that our military forces are drawn from a society in which opportunism—the desire for self-enhancement in a competitive environment—is not discouraged. Quite the opposite—we look with a certain sense of admiration upon the man who "gets there first with the most." Transferred to prison compounds of Korea in which survival itself was a challenge, opportunistic behavior reached extreme limits; here, not only self-interest but the denial of the interests of others was at play. The Judaeo-Christian principles in our society which impose moral and ethical limits on opportunistic behavior were little in evidence among Participators.

In this framework, it would seem that the Army can serve only to provide troops with an awareness of other goals in the hope that they may provoke substitute motivations on the part of men captured by the enemy. Many Participators really believed that, in supplying the captor with his psywar needs and thus bettering their lot, they were not doing anything "wrong," were not hurting the interests of their nation. Clearly, all troops should learn about the subtle yet powerful use which the enemy makes of its propaganda weapons. It is doubtful whether, without such an orientation, those PW's who might contribute to the enemy's psywar would consider themselves "traitors" in any sense of the term; the average Participator was probably not a soldier who would have sabotaged the mission of his rifle squad. Soldiers must realize that the enemy who offers preferential treatment is the same enemy who fought them with bullets on the battlefield, that to do his bidding in prison camp is tantamount to doing his bidding in combat. The motivations which drive the soldier to destroy the enemy in battle must be carried over beyond the barbed-wire enclosures. Unfortunately, in captivity the "kill or be killed" motive is not present except at a psychological level, and this concept must be learned by the soldier.

As part of a resistance training program, therefore, it is recommended that troops be taught the specific ways in which acts of participation aid the enemy's propagandistic cause and endanger the security of the United States. This is especially important with respect to contributions to the enemy's psychological warfare activities, considered by many PW's as "harmless" and well worth making in return for the opportunity to improve their living conditions. While it is unreasonable to assume that Army training can alter the opportunistic predispositions of some of its members, potential PW's ought to be

provided with criteria against which they can weigh the implications of their behavior. Helping them to understand the potency of psychological warfare as an enemy weapon is one approach.

Enemy psywar tactics should be understood by our soldiers in the context of the Communists' broad strategy of eternal warfare. Each aggressive act of the enemy—whether on the battlefield or in the guise of a request for petition signatures—should be seen as a reflection of the Communist principle of waging warfare at all times and with any available weapon, cold or hot. Soldiers and soldier-PW's can do no other than meet the enemy on these same terms: to resist and to carry the fight forward at every opportunity. It is providing a clearer understanding of the captured soldier's opportunities that constitutes a basic training mission.

Susceptibility to Threat vs. Acceptance of Pressure

There can be little question that imprisonment by the enemy presents a degree of threat to the captured soldier. The very newness of a completely unstructured situation such as capture provides fertile ground for feelings of insecurity and anxiety. For PW's in Korea, implied and explicit threat was applied in telling fashion by the Communists. It did not take long for the PW to perceive that the captor would, in fact, abuse PW's who refused to cooperate. The Communists did not have to act on all their threats in order for some PW's to become intimidated for, in addition to playing upon the tendency to avoid pain, the captor made it clear enough that by cooperating a PW could achieve a degree of "pleasure," comforts unique in the deprived and restricted environment of captivity. The opportunists paid their price—collaboration—and in return were relieved of the threat of mistreatment, with tangible and meaningful leniencies as an additional reward. Clearly, the Participator acted so as to avoid pressure, while the Resister "accepted" pressure and mistreatment as a consequence of his resistance.

The question posed for an Army training program by this finding is this: How can the PW's susceptibility to threat be reduced? Can the soldier be trained in such a way as to reduce his tendency to capitulate in the face of perceived threat? We are immediately led to the question of whether training which simulates the pressures encountered by the Resister would reduce the threat experienced by a prisoner when he faces his captor for the first time.

If we assume—as the Army does in its infantry training, for example—that the unknown is worse than the known, the answer is that such training would be beneficial. A basic trainee who crawls for yards under the fire of bullets or who sits in a foxhole while tanks pass above him is being trained by the Army how to behave in combat; but in addition he is gaining a sense of security by realizing that one <u>can</u> crawl under fire and live, and one <u>can</u> survive the experience of meeting a tank head on. Similarly, a soldier who is subjected in training to the pressures and deprivations of captivity may gain security in learning that one can (and Resisters in Korea did) thwart the captor, take punishment, and survive. There is a very real possibility that the Participators in

Korea perceived the captor's mistreatments as worse than they really were for most Resisters; that is to say, the threat they perceived was disproportionate to the real pressure they would in most instances have faced as Resisters. This would strengthen the assumption that simulated captor pressures represent a potentially beneficial training vehicle.

On the other hand, one can argue that such training would serve only to reinforce whatever insecurities the soldier nourishes about capture, that for the opportunistic individual training pressures might strengthen his "decision" to capitulate in the face of ordeal, and even increase the number of those who would do so.

The two contradictory hypotheses posed here can only be resolved—if at all—through careful, laboratory research. In the absence of such research, the evidence of this study favors the utilization of simulated pressures as part of a resistance training program, with one important reservation: The soldier must be also provided with positive information and orientation regarding his chances for effective resistance and the techniques he can utilize to enhance those chances. The infantry trainee learns not only to experience fire a few feet above him, but how to crawl and how to protect his rifle from being ruined. The "negative" type of learning provided by simulated PW pressures would be inadequate alone, for it gives the PW only a blind alley in which there is nothing to do but "take it"; "taking it" must become purposeful via a positive orientation of the type described earlier and through the training of positive resistance "skills."

Resistance "Skills"

What skills can be taught the soldier to enable him to resist the captor in a positive fashion? From the results of this study, three primary needs appear:

(1) The PW should be taught the skills required to activate and operate covert resistance organizations in internment. Such skills were all but absent in Korea, as is attested by the glaring lack of cohesiveness among Army PW's. The importance of the mission of such organizations should be stressed along with the techniques for setting them in successful operation. This requirement extends to enlisted men as well as officers, for we can expect the captor to try to thwart the emergence of Resister organizations by depriving the PW's of their normal leadership. It should be made clear that the captor profits more than he loses from organizations which drift among missions of vandalism, theft, and abuse of other PW's. Had PW's presented a homogeneous resistance front in Korea, it is difficult to see what the captor could have done to make his PW exploitation program effective.

(2) The PW should have the basic skills required to escape the captor and to survive under difficult conditions. Having had training in the preparations essential for escape and survival, the PW would not only have a more realistic possibility of escaping successfully, but would have an element of hope, a potential break in the bleak and seemingly endless routine of captivity.

(3) Many PW's were unaware of (or were not motivated to practice) the basic essentials of physical hygiene in captivity. In the

face of an unknown term in captivity, the phenomenon of "give-up-itis" appeared, marked by a disregard for personal cleanliness, health, and ultimately—according to the reports of returning physicians—even physical survival. A PW who no longer shows concern for himself is hardly likely to show concern for his fellows. The soldier should be taught the necessities of physical hygiene and their importance in survival in the face of the deprivation and illness typical of captivity.

Acceptance of Communism

Before the role of "ideological training" in an Army resistance training program is discussed, it would be well to summarize the relevant findings of this study:

(1) Only 12 per cent of the Army PW's in Korea accepted their captor's ideological teachings to any degree, and among those who did more than half came away with only a mild affinity toward Communism.

(2) Among the 45 per cent of the Participators who showed sympathy toward Communism, almost half accepted little of the captor's teachings.

(3) The correlation between degree of acceptance of Communism and degree of participation is only moderately high; moreover, when we hold other factors constant, we find that the independent relationship between these two factors is low, considerably lower than that between other factors and participation behavior (e.g., susceptibility to inducements and pressure).

Taken together, these findings lead to the conclusion that the dynamics of collaborative activity must be explained on grounds other than purely ideological ones. If the only motivation operative in prisoners' participation behavior were the support of Communist indoctrination dogma, the Army's training responsibilities would be very simply resolved. Such is not the case, however. It is clear enough that the PW's who cooperated with the enemy acted primarily for the more tangible, material reasons described earlier. The hypothesis that soldiers' resistance potential would be significantly increased through training courses comparing the fallacies of Communism with the strengths of American Democracy cannot be substantiated.

In this context it would be useful again to draw an analogy between a soldier's resistance behavior in combat and in internment. The good combat soldier acts out of self-preservation, but also out of a hostile, aggressive, fighter's stance taken toward the enemy; it is questionable whether many troops in the field carry the fight to the enemy because of ideological considerations. In captivity the Resister (a more frequently decorated soldier to begin with) continued to carry the fight to the enemy, and in the light of the findings of this study it is equally questionable whether ideological considerations—either in support of the ideals of liberty or in contempt for Marxism—drove the Resister to behave in the way he did. Equally, we cannot assume that the Middle Men would have been more resistive and less inactive if they had been so indoctrinated as to recognize the fallacies in the captor's ideological persuasions. These were men of relatively low education and intelligence, and it is unreasonable to think that—as Americans—they could be

so heavily indoctrinated, either in the schools or by the military, that a contempt for Communism as a way of life would shape their behavior.

This is not to say that no positive action is possible. The soldier should be prepared to expect a flood of Communist indoctrination as a PW, and he should be forewarned that in being subjected to such a torrent he may begin to doubt what he has known to be true. It is likewise true, even given the present findings, that increased indoctrination of American troops at an ideological level may alter the behavior of some PW's. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that material and not ideological considerations were paramount in the Korean compounds, the utility of strong emphasis on ideological dogma in Army training is highly questionable.

Resistance vs. Passivity

We should not underestimate the importance of the finding that the behavior of 80 per cent of the Army PW's in Korea—the Middle Men—was marked by passivity, withdrawal, and avoidance of action either in a collaborative or resistive direction. If the mission of the Army were to reduce to a minimum the number of Participators, then this Group—the great mass of all PW's—would present no problem; they did not behave like Participators. If, on the other hand, the Army's mission were to increase to a maximum the number of Resisters, then the Middle Group would present a real problem; they certainly did not behave like Resisters.

With respect to most troops, then, the first job at hand would be to activate them, to make "fighters" out of them. It might be speculated that the Middle Man is the same soldier who, while he may not go AWOL, does not fire his rifle at the enemy either. The performance of the middle-of-the-roaders evokes a training mission analogous to that designed to activate the fighting potential of combat troops. Expecially in view of their lower intelligence, the importance of motivating PW's by indicating that a captured soldier has a purposeful mission is particularly applicable to the Middle Man.

The Prisoner's Mission

The "give-up" behavior attributed to many of the deceased PW's reflects a pattern of purposelessness which generally surrounded the behavior of PW's in Korea. By and large, Army troops captured in Korea gave no evidence of feeling that they had a mission to perform as prisoners of war. Virtually the only goal-directed activity was that encouraged among some PW's by the captor.

To say that a PW has a mission is not to say that the soldier
d try to accomplish this mission by being captured. However, if
ed, the soldier must not feel that his utility as a fighting man is
In a war of ideas the PW's mission, at the very least, is to
the enemy's psychological warfare effort as ineffective as pos-
Army training should encourage troops to view prisoner status
rposeful; if it does not do so, it defaults to the captor who, without question, brings to his captives a potent mission of his own.

Chapter 1

PROBLEM AND PROCEDURES

THE PROBLEM

Military Aspects

The Korean conflict brought to light more clearly than ever before the fact that captured troops can serve as a potentially powerful vehicle for the advancement of Communist psychological warfare objectives. As part of a world-wide propagandistic effort to win support of Communist military and political goals, the enemy utilized U.S. Army PW's in Korea to forge a concerted psychological warfare campaign designed to discredit the United States and the United Nations efforts in the Far East.

There are no criteria by which to measure the success of their efforts. It is a fair assumption, however, that the Communists increased the credibility of their propaganda through the systematic exploitation of Army PW's. In extracting prisoner petitions labeling our Korean effort as "Truman's War" and as an outgrowth of "Wall Street Capitalism," for example, the Communists may have considerably enhanced their chances of winning sympathy and support in the Orient. Or, by broadcasting the recorded statements of our own troops indicating that, having seen Communism first hand, prisoners were now convinced of the righteousness of Communism and its goals in fighting the "People's War," they may have appreciably damaged our prestige among neutral and potentially friendly nations.

In anticipation of future conflicts in which the Communists may again hold captive large numbers of our military forces, the problem faced by the U.S. Army is highlighted by the fact that Army personnel comprised 93 per cent of the troops captured by the Communists in Korea. This does not mean, however, that the gravity of the challenge posed by Communist exploitation of PW's can be measured purely in terms of the proportion of our troops who are likely to be taken prisoner, or of the smaller number who would actually contribute significantly to the enemy's psychological warfare activities. On such a basis the Korean experience would deserve little attention, for less than one per cent of all Army troops were captured during that operation and, among them, only a relatively small percentage actively cooperated with the captor.

There is, as a matter of fact, no method by which we can weigh the increment loss to our national effort which results from the successful exploitation by the enemy of even a single prisoner of war. This is so

because the potency of psychological warfare as a weapon cannot itself be gauged accurately. In a war of ideas, in which the stakes are the attitudes and sympathies of whole peoples, no one can know what gains can be made by the utilization of a single idea, a single propagandistic "bullet." In the hands of the enemy all PW's are potential idea-weapons, and the damage rendered our nation by the successful exploitation of any one of them may be considerable.

This much is certain: A soldier captured by the Communists cannot be considered purely as a single casualty. A fighting man lost through injury or death represents a unit of our military strength removed; so does one captured by the enemy, but more, he may be added to the enemy's forces—and in a role potentially much more potent than that of, say, an infantryman. Thus, a simple statistic describing the number of men captured by the Communists—physically, or even psychologically—is not indicative of the real losses we incur by their activities as prisoners of war.

It is in this context that the experiences and behavior of our PW's in Korea revealed a need by the Army for measures designed to offset the planned program of exploitation waged by the enemy. Specifically, the need was recognized for a program of Army indoctrination and training which would provide our troops, in the event of their capture, with appropriate defenses against their Communist captors.

Research Missions

(1) In order to develop an Army training program designed to provide troops with defenses against Communist exploitation, it is necessary first to know what attributes need to be trained. What traits, skills, or knowledge are required by PW's to aid them in resisting their captors? It was toward the solution of this problem that this research was primarily directed. By identifying those characteristics which differentiate Resister and Participator PW's, the present study provides a basis for the structuring of any Army PW resistance training program.

(2) A major premise underlying this research was that resistance potential would be enhanced if, without unduly arousing their anxieties, military personnel were made aware of the experiences they might expect to meet should they become prisoners of the Communists. A foreknowledge of the facts of prisoner-of-war life (the techniques of coercion and indoctrination, for example, used by the Communists) would serve to strengthen the posture of soldiers captured by the enemy. A second research mission was therefore to provide a comprehensive description of the experiences and behavior of Army troops captured in Korea.

THE SAMPLE

Background

Of the 7,190 American fighting men taken prisoner in Korea, 93 per cent, or 6,656 men, were Army troops. One-half of these PW's died

during their internment—a considerable loss, in human as well as purely military terms. Very few data are available concerning the internment behavior and circumstances of death of this large segment of Army prisoners who, if we were to use the broadest possible criterion of resistance toward the enemy, could not be considered to have withstood their captors successfully. Of necessity the present study will consider the history of this group only very briefly. This fact, however, does not reflect their importance as a subject for inquiry.

In the prisoner exchanges following the Korean hostilities, a total of 3,323 Army PW's were repatriated. It was these men only who served as the population from which the sample for this research was drawn.

Criteria for Selection

Immediately after the completion of each of the Korean prisoner exchanges (Operations Little Switch and Big Switch), the U.S. Army Intelligence Branch began its interviews and interrogations of the liberated Army PW's. From the records of these interrogations, the researchers compiled cards indicating those acts of participation and resistance committed by the PW's in internment. These cards were used in the following fashion in an initial attempt to categorize the Army PW's in terms of their prison camp behavior.

(1) Those PW's who committed at least two acts of participation (at least one of which was corroborated) and no acts of resistance were classified as Participators.

(2) Those PW's who committed at least two acts of resistance (at least one of which was corroborated) and no acts of participation were classified as Resisters.

(3) Those PW's who committed acts both of participation and of resistance were classified under the heading of "Fence Sitters."

This criterion classification proved to have two major limitations. First, in both the Resister and the Participator Groups the number of clearly defined cases was too small to serve as a basis for thorough statistical analyses. Secondly, this system did not account for the very large number of cases who could not legitimately be included in any of the three categories, such as those PW's concerning whom there was no evidence either of participation or of resistance.

At this point in the research the Department of the Army had completed its study of the returned prisoners' interrogation files and—on the basis of the prison camp experiences and behavior of each of the repatriated PW's—had determined what action, if any, should be taken in each soldier's case (e.g., court-martial, dishonorable discharge). These determinations were utilized as the bases for establishing criterion categories. From a roster of the liberated PW's, together with a summary description of Army action taken or pending in each case at that time (late 1954), the researchers could place each PW in one of the following groups:

PARTICIPATORS: This group was made up of men who had been recommended for court-martial or dishonorable discharge under the Army Personnel Security Program. In addition, it included PW's

who would have been prosecuted had they not already been discharged from the military service.

MIDDLE GROUP: These were PW's concerning whom the Army had little or no derogatory information, and those cases temporarily marked "Undetermined" by virtue of the conflicting evidence then available.

RESISTERS: This group contained all PW's who were decorated for meritorious behavior as prisoners and, as well, those for whom recommendations for decoration were later disapproved.

All repatriated PW's could be accounted for by utilizing this classification scheme. It should be noted, too, that the overlap between these Army-based groupings and the earlier classification was very high (87%). Before selecting a sample, only one modification was necessary. Because the number of Resister cases available through the Army's classification was small, 44 cases were added to this Group by utilizing additional data. All returnees who had performed at least two acts of resistance and no acts of participation, and against whom the Army had no derogatory information, were included in the final Resister Group.[1]

The criterion which served to place a PW in one of the three Groups[2] was his over-all behavior in internment. It should be made clear that, with the exception of the additional Resister cases, the antecedent judgments by which the PW's were finally categorized were made not by the researchers but by the Army.

Method of Selection

After each of the returning PW's had been identified as either a Participator, a Resister, or a "Middle Man," it was then necessary to choose for detailed study a sample which would reflect as closely as possible the distributions of important characteristics among the total prisoner population. The actual sampling procedure was somewhat different for each of the three criterion Groups, as described below and summarized in Figure 1.



Figure 1

[1]A PW was considered to have performed a specific act of participation or resistance if he admitted it, or if two or more of his fellow PW's alleged that he had committed it.

[2]The Participator, Middle, and Resister PW Groups will be referred to occasionally in this report simply as "the PW Groups."

PARTICIPATORS: Fifteen per cent of the total PW population fell into the Participator Group. One-half of the Participators were selected for the sample, by the following procedure: Pertinent background data for each of these PW's were recorded on IBM punch cards, and the cards for each of the Participator subgroups (court-martial cases, administrative action cases, and those no longer in the Army) were separated. Within each of these subgroups, the PW cards were ordered by rank, within rank by race, within race by principal prison camp in which held, within camp by length of military service, and within length of service by number of months in captivity. Beginning with the second card (a random choice between numbers "1" and "2"), every second Participator was then selected as a member of the sample; the total number was 254 PW's who, by virtue of the stratification procedure, reflected the same proportions of ranks, races, prison camps, lengths of service, and months in captivity as existed in the total population of Participators.

MIDDLE GROUP: Eighty per cent of the repatriated PW's were categorized neither as Participators nor as Resisters. In the same fashion as for the Participators, the three subgroups among these Middle Men (those on whom little derogatory information had been found, those with no derogatory information, and those cases as yet undetermined) were separated and then ordered by the five background characteristics used to stratify the Participator sample. A number between 1 and 13 was then randomly chosen, and beginning with this (the 7th) numbered card, every thirteenth Middle PW was selected. The resulting number was 205.

RESISTERS: Five per cent of the PW population fell into the Resister Group. A sample derived from among these PW's would have been too small for subsequent analysis; for this reason all Resisters among the returning PW's, 144 men, were selected as subjects for this study.

The final number of PW's on which this research was based totaled 579, as against 603 in the original sample. The 24 cases lost were PW's for whom data were not available at the time the study was conducted. In all but a few instances the dossiers containing transcripts of the interrogations of these men (the basic research data) were then being utilized by the Army for official action.

The distribution of these PW's among the three criterion Groups should be noted in order to identify the direction of bias, if any, introduced by their absence from the original sample. This distribution is shown in Table 1. All but a small percentage of the Resister and Middle Group cases sampled were available for this study, and the missing cases for these Groups cannot be considered as biasing the data in any way. The files for these PW's appeared to be unavailable in random fashion—being moved to another office or used for specific testimony. Among the Participators, on the other hand, data for a somewhat larger proportion—7 per cent—of the cases were not available; more important, half of these men could validly be considered as extreme Participators by virtue of their designation by the Army as court-martial cases. Roughly one-third of the court-martial cases originally sampled were

Table 1

DISTRIBUTION OF CASES AMONG THREE CRITERION GROUPS

Group	Number Sampled	Not Available		Final Sample
		Number	Per Cent	
Participators				
Court martial	23	8	35	15
Administrative action	94	4	4	90
Not in Army	137	4	3	133
Total	254	16	7	238
Middle				
No derogatory information	38	1	3	37
Minor derogatory information	147	1	1	146
Undetermined	20	0	0	20
Total	205	2	1	203
Resisters				
Decorated	66	4	6	62
Decoration not approved	34	1	3	33
Two resistance acts	44	1	2	43
Total	144	6	4	138
Grand Total	603	24	4	579

not included in the final analysis because, at the time the data for this study were collected, the files for these particular PW's were being studied by Army authorities.

How might this affect our findings? Since the final sample contained a smaller number of court-martial Participators than were originally selected, it can safely be assumed that the bias introduced was a conservative one. That is to say, any differences brought to light between Participators and Resisters represent a minimum estimate of the real differences between the two Groups. Because the direction of bias incurred is known, the unavailability of the 24 cases in the final sample imposes no serious limitation on the interpretation of the results of this research.

THE DATA

The PW Dossiers

Ideally, in a study such as this the data would be collected by the researchers directly from the prisoners of war themselves, through controlled interviewing and testing procedures. When this proved to be unfeasible it was decided to utilize the Army Intelligence interrogations of the PW's as the major source of data. Transcripts of these interrogations for each returning PW had been compiled by the Army in dossiers which for the most part included also a psychiatric history and

evaluation, and miscellaneous letters, diaries, and photographs relevant to that PW's internment history. Each dossier contained a listing of all allegations—favorable and unfavorable—made about the individual by his fellow prisoners in their own responses to interrogation.

The major limitation in the utilization of these dossiers for research lay in the fact that they lacked uniformity, with respect to both quality and quantity of information. The dossier data had been compiled for purposes of intelligence—about the enemy and about the soldier himself—rather than to meet research needs of a somewhat different nature. Many questions which would have contributed information of value to this study had not been asked, and many relevant topics had been touched upon but not covered thoroughly or uniformly from case to case. For some PW's, for example, a lengthy psychiatric history had been obtained; for others, only the barest vital statistics were available. Some PW's had given long and telling descriptions of indoctrination procedures; others—though indoctrinated for a similar period—had reported little or nothing. Thus, the problem posed for the researchers at the outset was to organize for research analysis data not intended for such purposes.

Additional Sources

In addition to the basic data derived from the PW dossiers, pertinent data regarding the sample of PW's studied were collected from a number of secondary sources.

The Medical Statistics Branch of The Surgeon General's Office supplied the medical histories of the PW's in internment and the medical evaluations made of these men immediately after liberation. These data had already been recorded for all returning PW's on IBM punch cards and had only to be transcribed on additional card decks for use by HumRRO.

The Adjutant General's Office provided photostat copies of Personnel Forms 20 and 66 for the PW's in the research sample. Data describing civilian and military background characteristics of the PW's were recorded from these forms. In addition, the Battle Casualty Branch of The Adjutant General's Office provided the researchers with a number of vital statistics about the PW's.

An attempt was made to utilize also the psychological test data gathered from PW's by the Walter Reed Army Graduate School of The Surgeon General's Office. Of the more than 900 PW cases studied by this group, however, only 135 cases overlapped with the sample utilized in this study. Because of the small number involved, these data were not analyzed independently.

CAUTIONS IN THE APPLICATION OF THIS RESEARCH

The potential utility of this research lies in our ability to apply its conclusions in the solution of problems which the Army may face in future PW experiences. It is important, therefore, to recognize the cautions which must be exercised in extrapolating from the results of this study.

(1) This study applies only to Army personnel. Differences between Army personnel and those of other branches of the armed forces may exist not only with respect to the backgrounds and motivations of the men themselves, but more certainly with respect to the manner in which men from different branches are viewed as targets for exploitation by the captor.

(2) This study is concerned only with prisoner-of-war experiences at the hands of Communist captors and, more specifically, Oriental Communists. The results have no relevance for experiences Army troops may possibly have as PW's of a non-Communist enemy. To the degree that the Chinese Communist treatment of PW's might differ from that of Communists of other nations, the results of this research must be interpreted with caution. From all indications, however, the history of Communist exploitation of PW's follows a fairly consistent pattern, reaching perhaps its clearest definition in Korea.

(3) This study is concerned with the experiences of PW's in a war which was unique in a number of ways. Unquestionably the Korean conflict differed in scope and mission from other major wars fought by the United States. U.S. intervention in Korea was based on goals which may have been more difficult for troops to understand than those which were understood by men who fought the Japanese, say, in World War II. As a component of a U.N. "police action," Army forces may conceivably have been less motivated than troops of other wars. Our soldiers may also have had some difficulty in understanding the concept of a limited war in which, for example, military victory appeared to be within our grasp yet was not pursued for reasons of national policy. These are unknown factors which cannot be demonstrated, but they should be kept in mind as being possibly related to the behavior of PW's in Korea. In addition, in a future large-scale war the distribution of certain background characteristics among the Army population would probably differ from those which obtained in the relatively small-scale Korean effort.

(4) Both in captivity and in the setting of the post-repatriation interview, circumstances were such that anxieties were likely to be aroused in the PW's. Because of this factor in particular, it is reasonable to assume that all of the PW's may not have been able to perceive accurately all of the events in the prison compounds or to recollect these events faultlessly after their repatriation.

(5) The basic data for this study were collected under circumstances vulnerable to the introduction of biases, both of the source and of the interrogator. As noted earlier, Army interrogations of repatriated PW's were intended for the most part as a source of intelligence about the soldiers' behavior in internment. Each PW was aware that the information he gave might be used in the administrative handling of his case; the interrogators, too, were aware of their role as preliminary reviewers of the evidence with respect to each PW. These circumstances appear to raise a challenge to the validity of the information studied; that is to say, quite apart from the random errors incurred in the collection of the interview data, definite biases were very likely operative.

This limitation becomes considerably less damaging than it at first appears when account is taken of the fact that we can be fairly

certain of the direction of bias introduced. Prisoners who cooperated with the enemy can logically be assumed to have been defensive when interrogated, and thus more reticent about divulging certain kinds of information than were those who resisted. This hypothesis was tested by comparing the proportions of PW's in the three Groups for whom no dossier information was available with respect to certain questions. In general, although interrogators interviewed suspected Participators more intensively than others (the Participator dossiers were "thicker" than those of other PW's), the coders found a higher proportion of "no information" (no response) in Participator dossiers than in those of non-Participators. While this finding does not, of itself, present rigorous proof, it does add weight to the reasonable assumption that the bias is in most instances one which tends to minimize the differences found between Participators and Resisters. This assumption would, of course, be less applicable where there is reason to suspect that the Resisters (and Middle Men) also responded in such a way as to put themselves in a more favorable light than their actual prison behavior warranted.

In spite of these limitations, the data for this study are considered to provide the best information available concerning the experiences and behavior of American PW's in Communist hands. Because the direction of at least one bias introduced in the collection of the data can be gauged, the results may be interpreted with greater confidence than would otherwise have been possible.

PROCEDURES

Determination of Items for Study

Thirty PW dossiers were examined in order to determine what distinct items of information might be available for study within the entire sample of 579 dossiers. The regularity of occurrence, the relevance, and the codability of each item were judged, and on the basis of these criteria roughly one-fourth were dropped. Altogether, 213 items of data drawn from the dossiers were retained for study. They may be subsumed under the following categories:

- Civilian and Military Background
- Vital Statistics on Capture and Internment
- Acts of Participation
- Acts of Resistance
- Interrogation Experiences
- Indoctrination Experiences
- Preferential Treatment
- Mistreatment
- PW Relationships
- Contacts With Outside World
- PW Attitudes Toward Communism
- Medical and Psychiatric Data

Framework for Data Collection

Codes. Information derived from the initial survey of 30 dossiers served as a basis for preliminary codes constructed for all 213 items. These codes were pretested with 10 additional dossiers before the final code book and instructions for recording the data were prepared.

Rating Scales. A quantitative assessment of the PW's on important aspects of internment was impossible through the specific items of information coded directly from the dossiers. To obtain such assessments it was necessary to establish rating scales by which the PW's were "measured" on those factors hypothesized to be of relatively great importance for this study. The ratings on any given scale were based on relevant data found in the dossiers and recorded as specific items of information through the coding procedures described.

As an example, a prisoner's dossier provided descriptions of specific mistreatments and threats endured by that PW during his internment, yet no over-all assessment of the degree of pressure the PW endured—as compared to other PW's—was directly available. The "Pressure" Rating Scale permitted such assessments to be made:

To what degree was this PW threatened and mistreated by his captor during internment?

Not at all	Relatively little	A moderate degree, less than most	A moderate degree, more than most	A great deal	Extreme amount	Unknown

Twenty-seven rating scales—each with six points—were devised for this study; they are described more fully in the section of this report dealing with a correlation analysis of the rating-scale data. In general, the scales may be subsumed under the following headings:

PW Treatment
Interrogation and Indoctrination
PW Relationships
PW Traits and Attitudes
PW Behavior

Additional Data. Dossier information not available regularly enough for inclusion in the codes was recorded both as specific items of information and in qualitative form. These data were later used in interpreting and amplifying the over-all statistical findings.

Processing of the Dossiers

A team of 10 persons was assembled to process the dossier data. Although all had previous experience in codifying data for research, the unstructured quality of the data for this study made it especially necessary for the coders to be thoroughly familiarized with their task. All members of the coding team therefore were given two weeks of orientation and training, devoted in large part to practice in the processing of dossiers.

The dossiers available at any given time during the data collection period included a selection from the Participator, Middle, and Resister Groups. The dossiers were chosen by the coders in random fashion,

and in no case was a coder aware of the criterion Group to which a given dossier belonged. The data collection was supervised by the project leader and members of the research team; questions of procedure and data interpretation were resolved through meetings with the individual coder and, when indicated, by group discussion.

Reliability of Data Collection Procedures

The transformation of dossier data into specific items of coded information was open to two primary sources of error—the possibility that a PW's response to a given question may have been subject to more than one interpretation, either by different members of the research team or by the same member on different occasions, and the possibility of mechanical errors in setting down the correct code for a given response. To determine the degree of consistency with which the data for this report were coded, two reliability checks were utilized at intervals during the coding procedures:

(1) Each member of the coding staff was required to reprocess selected dossiers a second time, with an interval of at least 10 dossiers (roughly two weeks) between. In this fashion, the degree of reliability of each coder in interpreting and recording the dossier data was determined.

(2) All coders processed selected dossiers in common. This provided an assessment of the consistency among the staff in their codification of the data.

The results indicate a high degree of reliability, especially considering the unstructured nature of the dossier information. The percentage of dossier items (including rating scales) coded differently by the same coders ranged from 1 per cent to 6 per cent with an average error of roughly 4 per cent[1] for the staff as a whole; inconsistencies among different coders also were fairly infrequent. A tally of the items for which discrepancies were found indicated no specific items which were unreliably coded with atypically high frequency. In general, then, the reliability tests revealed no serious limitation on the interpretation of the findings of this study.

Analysis Procedures

The Comparison of Three PW Groups

Primarily, the data for this study were analyzed by statistical techniques designed to determine the reliability (statistical significance) of the differences found among the three criterion Groups with respect to all items of information. In most instances interest lay in determining whether or not the distribution of the three Groups with respect to a given item (e.g., education level) indicated that the Groups were drawn from the same population. Such inter-Group comparisons were made

[1]The standard error of this percentage is .0034, and the probability is .90 that the true error lies at 4% ± .005; i.e., between 3½% and 4½%.

by chi-square analysis. In other instances it was important to determine also the statistical reliability of the difference between two proportions (e.g., the percentage of Participators and Resisters who were subjected to a specific indoctrination technique). This was accomplished through t tests. In addition to these basic analyses, the data for the three Groups were also compared to determine differences in the proportions of those responding as against those giving no response ("no information"), and differences in the number of responses (e.g., number of mistreatments) per Group.

The criterion for a statistically reliable difference was constant throughout. Differences among the Participator, Middle, and Resister Groups significant at the .10 probability level were accepted as sufficiently reliable for purposes of this study. That is to say, a difference had to be of such magnitude that the probability of its occurrence by chance alone was 10 or less out of 100. Differences significant at between the .11 and .50 probability levels, although reported, are regarded as inconclusive; those differences attributable to chance with probabilities higher than 50 per cent are reported here as "no difference."

It should be pointed out that most of the major findings and conclusions of this study are based on highly significant differences whose probability of occurrence by chance alone is less than one in 100, and in many cases less than one in 1000. The specific probability levels for differences found with respect to each item analyzed were catalogued and retained in the HumRRO files, where they are available for the interested reader. In this report the use of the term "difference" connotes a statistically reliable difference at the accepted levels (.10 or less) unless otherwise indicated.

The PW's as a Whole

Many of the findings of this report are stated in terms of all returning PW's, irrespective of their grouping as Participators, Middle Men, or Resisters. Such findings were derived by expanding the data for each of the three Groups in terms of the rate by which PW's in each Group were sampled. That is to say, because of the sampling technique utilized it was possible, for any given item of information, to multiply the number of Participators by two, the number of Middle Men by 13, the number of Resisters by one and, by summing these data, to derive a figure for that item descriptive of all PW's.

Chapter 2

ACTS OF PARTICIPATION AND RESISTANCE

INTRODUCTION

The categorization by the Army of any one prisoner as a Participator, Resister, or Middle Man was an over-all judgment on the kinds of acts which he committed in internment. There is no question but that the act of informing for example, tended to identify a PW as a Participator, or that having made anti-Communist speeches helped type a PW as a Resister. Judgments as to the importance of each act were made by Army review boards in the context of additional facts known about the PW, such as the pressures to which he had been subjected, and the frequency with which he had committed other acts of resistance or participation. This chapter is not concerned with the criteria used or the decisions reached by the Army in their selection of PW's as collaborators or heroes. The results reported here simply summarize the circumstances and frequency of specific acts of participation and resistance among Army PW's in Korea.

CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER AN ACT WAS COMMITTED

In codifying the data contained in the PW dossiers, information regarding the commission of each act of participation and resistance was recorded in one of five ways. As an illustration, the item dealing with informing on fellow PW's is shown here:

INFORMED ON FELLOW PW's

1 - Yes, this act is admitted by the PW and is alleged by two or more PW's
2 - Yes, this act is admitted by the PW but is not alleged by two or more PW's
3 - Yes, this act is not admitted by the PW but is alleged by two or more PW's
4 - Yes, this act is denied by the PW but is alleged by two or more PW's
5 - No, this act is neither admitted by the PW nor alleged by two or more PW's

It can be seen from this procedure that a PW was considered as having committed a specific act if his dossier contained an admission to that effect, or if—even in the absence of an admission or the presence of a denial—there were at least two allegations by other PW's that he

did commit that act. A single, uncorroborated allegation was not considered sufficient evidence for a "Yes." For purposes of this report, the five categories were collapsed into two, with the distinction drawn only between those PW's who did and did not commit a given act.

ACTS OF PARTICIPATION

Informing on Fellow PW's

Ten per cent of the Army PW's in Korea acted as informers at least once during their internment. As expected, this act was found to have been committed almost exclusively by those PW's classified as Participators. The proportions of informers within the three Groups studied are reported in Figure 2.



Figure 2

Among non-Participators, probably no other act created as much resentment, hostility, and overt, abusive action toward "Pros"[1] as did informing. It was the stigma of "ratting" that widened the breach between Participators and non-Participators to such an extent that little possibility existed for communication between them. Terms such as "cheese eaters," "rats," and "stoolies" were commonly used by Resister and Middle Group PW's in describing the despised Participators; very frequently they characterized all Participators as informers.

The data indicate that somewhat over half of the Participators informed on their fellow captives. Case histories of informers indicate that this act was designed to curry favor with the captor, to ensure the receipt of preferential treatment and special privileges. Such were the motives, for example, of a PW who joined a group of Resisters in planning an escape attempt and then, at the moment when the machinery for escape was set in motion, pulled out from the group and informed the captor of his fellows' plans. In the context of this PW's value system the rewards were ample: a position of prestige in the camp, greater freedom of movement, and fewer work details.

[1]Participators were referred to frequently by their fellows as "Progressives," or "Pros."

Apart from the act of informing, although in some instances no doubt related to it, some PW's behaved in ways which connoted a degree of close rapport between captive and captor. An example is the act of reporting their own activities to camp officials. Nine per cent of the Resisters and 6 per cent of the Middle Group reported to camp officials regarding their activities at least once during their internment; in contrast, 70 per cent of the Participators did so. This comparison becomes more meaningful when we take into account the circumstances in which such reports were made. The few Resisters who reported to camp officials did so primarily as a required part of their official camp duties. The Participators, on the other hand, for the most part reported voluntarily. Ninety-five per cent of the Participators who reported to their officials did so at least once when it was not required of them. In this way they evidenced their willingness to please the captor, to "stay on his good side." This is, in other words, one of the many instances in which the behavior of the Participators had "apple for the teacher" overtones.

Collaborative ties with the captor were also strengthened, though fairly infrequently, through walks with camp officials. Thirteen per cent of the Participators took such walks or visited informally with officials. In part, these walks were used by the captor as a subtle indoctrination technique. Personal, individual contacts were pointed out by returning PW's as one of the more effective indoctrination procedures experienced in internment. More important perhaps, such walks, in an atmosphere of intimacy, served to reinforce whatever collaborative tendencies already existed among Participator PW's.

As a summary of the many acts which typified the PW-captor relationship, repatriates described themselves and their fellow captives as either friendly or unfriendly toward their captor. Two-thirds of the Participators can be considered to have been friendly toward their captor, in contrast to only 5 per cent of the remaining two Groups. While such friendliness itself defines no specific collaborative act, it does nevertheless encompass a whole complex of attitudes and behaviors which propelled some PW's along the road to ever-increasing cooperation with the enemy.

Interfering With Escape Activities

Among the more obvious ways in which a PW might have thwarted the captor was by escaping from camp. Data regarding escape activities will be described subsequently, in a section dealing with acts of resistance. PW interference with these activities constituted a considerable contribution to the captor's efforts of control. We find that 10 per cent of the Participators interfered with the escape activities or escape plans of their fellow PW's during internment. This was accomplished primarily by their acting as informers; 92 per cent of those Participators who interfered with escape did so by "ratting" on their fellows. Only isolated instances of interference are found among non-Participator PW's; in all these cases, interference consisted solely of arguments against the feasibility of attempting escape.

Contributing to the Propaganda Functions of the Enemy

There is little doubt that the Chinese Communist captors viewed their prisoners primarily as a potentially rich source of materials for a systematic, well-planned psychological warfare campaign against the United States and the United Nations. Their goals were strategic as well as tactical; to judge from enemy propaganda output, the enemy's motives were primarily to discredit the U.S.–U.N. Korean effort in the eyes of the fighting forces in Korea and among civilian populations whose sympathies and support of the Communist bloc were sought. The fact that most of the acts of participation committed by Army troops in internment served as contributions to the enemy's propaganda efforts can be regarded as a reflection of the enemy's emphasis in the exploitation of PW's.

The extent of the captor's success in his attempts to secure propagandistic contributions from the Army PW's as a whole is shown in Figure 3. Seventy per cent of the PW's acted to some degree—wittingly or unwittingly—in ways which aided the enemy's psywar effort; however, only a small proportion made extensive propaganda contributions, and the contributions of almost half of the PW's were slight.



Figure 3

Sizable differences are found when we compare the extent of contributions made by Participator, Middle Group, and Resister PW's (Figure 3). The major contrast lies between the Participators on the one hand, and the Middle and Resisters on the other. Almost half of the Participators made great contributions to the propaganda functions of the enemy, as compared to 2 per cent of the Middle Group and one per cent of the Resisters. At the other extreme, only one per cent of the Participators went through internment contributing nothing; among the remaining PW's roughly one-third fall in this category.

Making Recordings. Among the propaganda vehicles most useful to the enemy were recordings, made by PW's, containing speeches, discussions, and messages which reflected the Communist line. Themes frequently appearing in these recordings included appeals for peace, criticism of the U.S. and the U.N. and their leaders as "warmongers" and instigators of Korean atrocities, and pleas for the inactivation of U.S. war potential on Formosa. The propagandistic aspects of these recordings were sometimes subtly concealed—especially in the case of Christmas messages to the folks at home—and it is doubtful whether many of the PW's who participated in making them were seriously aware of their ultimate usefulness to the enemy.

Nearly one-fourth of the prisoners in Korea made recordings at one time or another during their internment. The proportions within each of the Groups studied are reported in Figure 4; the percentage of Participators who made recordings is four times as large as the percentage of Resisters who did so.



Figure 4

From all indications, an air of permissiveness pervaded the captor's techniques for securing recorded messages from the PW's. Prisoners were frequently allowed to write their own "scripts," although these were, of course, edited at the discretion of the captor. Three-fourths of those who made recordings did so voluntarily, 14 per cent only when required by the captor, and the remainder under both conditions. No differences in this connection surrounded the recording activities of Participator, Middle, and Resister PW's.

Some differences in the motives of Participators and other PW's are revealed when we compare the reasons they gave for making recordings. Only Participators—28 per cent of them—indicated that they

completely believed the contents. By far the largest proportion of all PW's who made recordings (84%) viewed them simply as vehicles for the delivery, via radio, of Christmas messages to their families in the United States. Here, too, however, inter-Group differences appear; all Resisters and 91 per cent of the Middle Group gave this as a reason as against only three-fourths of the Participators. Threats, mistreatment, and promises were seldom associated by the PW's with making recordings.

Contributing Articles to Enemy Newspapers. Eleven per cent of the Army PW's in Korea contributed at least one article utilized for propaganda in enemy newspapers, including those newspapers circulated in the prison camps themselves. Virtually all of this activity was confined to the Participators, among whom 56 per cent contributed articles; only 4 per cent of the Middle Group and one per cent of the Resisters engaged in this activity.

Writing Petitions. The content of petitions written by PW's in internment overlapped with that of the recordings. Some of these petitions were in fact subsequently recorded and broadcast by the enemy. Only 5 per cent of the prisoners participated in writing petitions, although, as will be shown subsequently, many more were involved in signing and circulating petitions prepared either by PW's or by the captor himself. Again, virtually all petitions originating from the PW's were the work of Participators. Twenty-nine per cent of this Group wrote propagandistic petitions for the captor; among the remaining PW's only one per cent did so.

Signing Petitions. Of all the contributions made by PW's to the propaganda functions of the enemy, the act most frequently committed was that of signing petitions; almost half (40%) of the PW's signed at least one petition during their internment. Two-thirds of the Participators, one-third of the Middle Group, and one-fourth of the Resisters did so (Table 2). These documents were utilized by the captor in propaganda intended to demonstrate that U.S. troops believed the Korean hostilities to be an extension of "American imperialism." The petitions contained requests for an end to the war and removal of U.S. forces from the Pacific, and statements describing U.S. leaders as "warmongers" and perpetrators of atrocities. In effect, the petitions were designed to win sympathy, among the psywar targets to which they were disseminated, for Communist goals of expansion in the Far East.

Table 2

SIGNING PETITIONS AMONG THREE PW GROUPS

(per cent)

Circumstances	Participators	Middle	Resisters
Voluntary	40	21	26
Required	48	79	74
Both	12	0	0
No Information	25	12	2
Total PW's Signing	149	70	36

The environment surrounding the signing of petitions was far different from the permissive one which surrounded the making of recordings. In the prisoner population as a whole, 72 per cent of those who signed petitions were required to do so. The proportions of PW's in the Participator, Middle, and Resister Groups who signed petitions voluntarily or otherwise are presented in Table 2. Again, the difference between the Participators and the remaining PW's is readily apparent. Roughly three-fourths of the Middle and Resister PW's who signed petitions did so only when it was required of them; among the Participators less than half fall in this category. These data are another of the many indications of the apparent readiness with which the Participators did the captor's bidding.

Specifically, what reasons did the PW's give for affixing their signatures to petitions obviously intended to serve the enemy's psychological warfare effort? Among all PW's who signed, most indicate that they were threatened into doing so. More Middle and Resister PW's (three-fourths of these Groups combined) were threatened than were Participators, among whom only half received threats. Although only 4 per cent of all PW's were mistreated prior to signing, it is noteworthy that almost half of the Resisters signed only after being mistreated—through deprivation, physical abuse, or confinement. Promises of preferential treatment were made to 12 per cent of the PW's, primarily to Participators and Middle Men. Six per cent claim to have believed the content of the petition; the Participators show the highest proportion (12%) claiming they believed the content. The number of reasons which led to the signing of petitions was greater for Resisters (1.74 per man) than for Participators (1.23 per man); the Middle Group falls between the two.

Circulating Petitions. The circulation of petitions among the prisoners themselves was used by the captor as a mode of indoctrination, and in some instances was accompanied by the requirement to sign. Only 5 per cent of the PW's were actively engaged in circulating petitions; again, such activity was confined primarily to the Participators. Among this group 35 per cent circulated petitions; none of the Middle Group and one per cent of the Resisters were active in this regard.

Performing "Full-Time" Propaganda Duties. One obviously convenient way in which the captor utilized PW's for psywar purposes was by incorporating propagandistic activities as part of their full-time duties in camp. Such was the case for 16 per cent of all the PW's in Korea. In this connection, Figure 5 presents a comparison of the three Groups studied. Over half of the Participators had jobs involving propaganda duties for a period during their imprisonment. This was true of a much smaller proportion of the remaining PW's—10 per cent of the Middle Group and 11 per cent of the Resisters.

Propaganda duties included those associated with the indoctrination of the prisoners themselves (e.g., monitoring group discussions or study periods), but primarily involved psychological warfare efforts aimed by the captor at a larger audience. Many of the acts which contributed to the captor's psywar program became for some PW's virtually a full-time job. As an example, 10 per cent of the Participators

were engaged as writers or cartoonists for enemy publications; others were charged with the creation of posters, charts, and other visual aids used in enemy propaganda messages.

Nearly 80 per cent of those in propaganda positions were appointed to that role by the captor. The remainder—in equal numbers—either volunteered or were elected by their fellow PW's. No differences in the manner of selection or the length of time on propaganda jobs are found among the three prisoner Groups compared. Most PW's served for a period of from one to three months; however, one-fourth served for a year or more.

PROPAGANDA DUTIES AMONG THREE PW GROUPS



Figure 5

One might suppose that those PW's with special skills would have been the likeliest candidates for propaganda jobs. As a matter of fact, only a fifth of the Participators who held such jobs did so by virtue of their education, skills, or prior experience. Cooperation with the Chinese Communist Forces was the primary qualification; 57 per cent of the Participator propagandists were selected by this criterion—mutually satisfying for both "employer" and "employee." For the captor, the selection of an already cooperative PW gave some assurance of conscientious effort; for the PW, the performance of propaganda duties afforded greater freedom and a release from some of the more trying work and routine associated with PW life.

The opportunity to leave the PW compound and live, even briefly, outside its confines was among the more sought-after privileges in internment. This privilege was afforded uniquely to Participator PW's, one-fourth of whom were granted the opportunity. Performance of propaganda duties was the commonest reason for living outside the camp proper; 45 per cent of those who lived outside the PW compound gave this reason, 29 per cent performed service duties, and 22 per cent left camp for special indoctrination training. It is evident enough that acts contributing to the captor's propaganda campaign—making speeches, writing articles, making broadcasts—afforded the PW who was willing to perform them an opportunity to live with increased freedom as a prisoner of war.

Making Confessions

In the sense that the confession of misdeeds was demanded by the captor, this act can be considered one of participation. Confessions were, however, more frequent among Resisters than among either Middle Men or Participators, as is indicated in Figure 6. This finding is a logical one, since the requirement to confess arose only after the PW had "transgressed" by ignoring camp regulations or committing acts of resistance. In extracting confessions, the Chinese captor utilized a well-known Russian Communist technique designed to break the spirit of the prisoner and induce abject support of the "regime."



Figure 6

For the PW population as a whole, oral confessions before a group and written ones were made with roughly equal frequency; only among the Participators do we find a few cases of confessions made privately to the captor. An analysis of the circumstances in which confessions were made reveals sizable differences among the three PW Groups studied. Among Resisters who made confessions, 45 per cent had been threatened with deprivation, confinement, physical abuse, non-repatriation, and even death; among the Middle Men and Participators combined, 90 per cent had been threatened before they signed confessions. Actual mistreatment, on the other hand, was more prevalent among Resisters than among other PW's. For example, 60 per cent of the Resisters who had signed confessions stated that they acceded after physical abuse; the same is true for only 25 per cent of the remaining PW's. On the average, each Resister who confessed had suffered two different types of mistreatment before confessing; the average among the non-Resisters is one. Thus, while more Resisters signed confessions, they clearly required stronger stimuli than did other PW's.

How did the PW's interpret the captor's motives for wanting confessions? Over a third of all PW's could give none. The most frequent reason ascribed to the Chinese for securing confessions was as a form of punishment for infractions of the camp regulations; 40 per cent of the PW's give this reason. Twenty per cent reported that the captor used confessions to shame PW's, and only 3 per cent saw this act as part of the captor's program to implement collaboration.

Exchanging Addresses with Enemy Personnel

Toward the close of their internment, PW's—in unknown numbers—were approached by Chinese captors for purposes of exchanging addresses. The captors' motives in doing this can only be guessed. It is a fair assumption, however, that their reasons were not born out of warm friendship, but rather their hope of continuing the tie which some PW's formed with Communism and Communists. Six per cent of all PW's exchanged addresses with the captor. A larger proportion of Participators (13%) did this than did Middle Men (5%) or Resisters (1%).

ACTS OF RESISTANCE

Considerably fewer data are available regarding specific acts of resistance performed in internment than regarding acts of participation. There are two reasons for this. First, there were apparently relatively few positive ways in which PW's resisted their captor in Korea; secondly, the post-repatriation interviews were designed, for the most part, to elicit information about collaboration and not resistance.

Considering the nature of the captor's demands and pressures, we can, of course, legitimately consider as acts of resistance the non-commission of most of those acts of participation described earlier. This section, however, will deal only with the few positive acts of resistance performed by our PW's during their Korean captivity.

Escape Activities[1]

None of the escape activities to be described here can be termed successful, in that the data concern only repatriated PW's who, even if they did escape from camp, were obviously returned after some period. This study includes no information on the frequency with which PW's engineered successful, permanent escapes. From the fragmentary data available, it would appear that PW's were successful in escaping to U.N. lines only during the evacuation period, when they eluded their immediate captors; there is no indication that any PW's succeeded in escaping permanently from an established camp.

Evacuation Period. Five per cent of the returning PW population made attempts to escape the captor during the evacuation period after their initial capture. In comparing the three criterion Groups on this score, we find a higher proportion of Resisters than Participators, 8 per cent as against 2 per cent. There is at least a suggestion here that the tendency to thwart the captor was more prevalent in one Group than the other even before the PW's arrived in permanent camp and the demands of the captor were clarified.

[1]There is evidence also that a small proportion of the PW's were given opportunities by the captor to escape, through the use of safe-conduct passes to the U.N. lines. According to most reports, this represented an attempt to have the PW's propagandize the line troops—to tell them of the benefits of PW life and persuade them to surrender. Safe-conduct passes had been offered to 7 per cent of the returning PW's; differences between Participators and Resisters are small and inconclusive.

Permanent Camp. Among all PW's repatriated from Korea, only 4 per cent succeeded in breaking through the confines of permanent camps and escaping for some distance before being returned. An additional 4 per cent were caught in the act of escaping, and 9 per cent more made plans to escape but never set them in motion. These are very small proportions of the population, to be sure; however, it is of some interest to compare the escape activities of the three criterion Groups studied, and to describe the circumstances surrounding the failure of escape plans and attempts.

The proportions of PW's in Participator, Middle, and Resister Groups who took part in escape activities of one form or another are shown in Table 3. Resisters more frequently engaged in escape activities than did either Middle Men or Participators. This applied equally to making plans for escape (without acting on them), getting caught in the act of escaping, and actually stealing away from the camp proper.

Apparently least active in escape efforts were the PW's of the Middle Group. This is especially true with regard to escape attempts which went beyond the planning stage; of the Middle PW's who were at all involved in escape activities, most (54%) got no further than making plans. Two factors must be considered as contributing to this finding. First, the inactivity of the Middle Men in escape is in keeping with the characteristics of these PW's[1] which identify them essentially as prisoners who were not prone to be active in any direction, either pro or con the captor, and who stayed in the background and did not become strongly involved in overt activities of any sort. Secondly, the difference between the Middle and Participator Groups is—in part, at least—a spurious one for, as will be shown, there is some reason to doubt that all of the "escapes" of the Participators represented bona fide efforts.

Half of the Participators who engaged in escape activities actually succeeded in escaping from camp; this is in contrast to only 38 per cent of the Resisters and 23 per cent of the Middle Men in the same category. This might suggest that Participators were the most successful "escapers." In the light of other data, however, it becomes fairly

Table 3

ESCAPE ACTIVITIES AMONG THREE PW GROUPS

(per cent)

Escape Activity	Participators (N = 238)	Middle (N = 203)	Resisters (N = 138)
Escaped from confines of camp	8	3	18
Caught in act of escaping	4	3	15
Made plans to escape but no attempt	5	7	15
Total percentage involved in escape activities	17	13	48

[1]See Chapter 11.

clear that many of the Participators who physically escaped were not escapees at all but rather "plants" among valid escapees, men who "went along for the ride" and then came back to relate to the captor the activities of their fellow PW's. Among the reasons given for the failure of escapes from camp, three-fourths indicate simply that the PW's were recaptured; direct knowledge of informers is present in only a small percentage of the cases. However, those who were caught in the act or did not set their plans in motion were more likely to know when failure had been due to informing. Forty-three per cent of those who were caught in the act, and for whom additional data are available, gave being informed on as the reason; 49 per cent of those who never implemented their plans also blamed informers. The highest proportion of those informed on is found, as expected, in the Resister Group. Within the Participator Group the proportion of informers was somewhat higher among those who escaped (67% of those who escaped informed on fellow PW's) than among those who did not (53% informed on their fellows). Because of the small number of cases involved (18 who escaped, 210 who did not escape), however, the difference must be regarded as inconclusive.[1]

From isolated case histories of Participator escapees, it appears that at least some of the punishments given these PW's were as bogus as the escapes themselves (e.g., solitary confinement for a very short period, or self-criticisms in which the Participator readily mouthed the "confessions" written by the captor).

In general, the most frequent punishment for escape was a "prison" sentence, sometimes solitary confinement, for varying periods of time. Taken as a whole, 42 per cent of the PW's who attempted unsuccessfully to escape, in either evacuation or permanent camp, were incarcerated. Twenty-five per cent were physically abused, and 6 per cent were given hard labor. Self-criticism, intensive interrogation, and material deprivation were also experienced by recaptured prisoners. On the average, each PW was punished in two of the ways mentioned.

Aiding Others in Escape

Twelve per cent of the Resisters gave aid to their fellow PW's in their attempts to escape from permanent camps in Korea. Only a third as many Participators and Middle Men offered assistance to their fellows in escape. (These incidents are distinct from those in which the PW himself was involved in an escape attempt.) Quite apart from help in planning, the aid given included supplies of food, clothing, and other essentials necessary to survival in the Korean countryside.

Making Anti-Communist Speeches

Half of the Resisters made anti-Communist speeches as PW's in Korea. Fourteen per cent of the Middle Group and 13 per cent of the

[1]The probability (p) that this finding can be attributed to chance is between 20 and 30 out of 100.

Participators also spoke against the Communists at least once during their imprisonment. Among PW's making anti-Communist speeches, almost half (46%) did so covertly, in clandestine groups inaccessible to the captor; a third (34%) spoke overtly, within "earshot" of the captor, and the remainder (20%) did both. Too few cases are available to permit inter-Group comparisons in this connection. Among Resisters, however, twice as many spoke overtly as did covertly. It is questionable whether open, anti-Communist speech-making in the Korean PW camp setting was an effective mode of resistance. It was, typically, the kind of act which, if discovered, brought severe reprisals. PW's who were ready to accept the Communist line might have been argued with most effectively in private. The data demonstrate, however, that not all private argumentation was on a solely verbal level; some, rather, took a physical form.

Beating "Pros"

Some Resisters, in describing their own attitudes or the attitudes of other Resisters toward Participators, spoke in terms of their being "anti-Progressive," and then defined this attitude by descriptions of "beating up" Participators. Eleven per cent of the Resisters fall in this category, as against none of the remaining PW's. The fact that, in general, returnees were not very prone to admit drastic behavior of any sort suggests that the figure is a minimum estimate of the number who physically abused suspected and known collaborators.

Chapter 3

CIVILIAN AND MILITARY BACKGROUND INFORMATION

INTRODUCTION

In general, few differences are to be found between Participators and Resisters with respect to their civilian and military backgrounds. Because background characteristics do not appear to be among the factors most strongly associated with participation and resistance behavior, the findings for most biographical items will be briefly summarized. In a number of ways, the background of the Middle Group differs significantly from that of both the Participators and the Resisters. The meaning of this pattern will be discussed in the chapter devoted exclusively to the Middle Group.

CIVILIAN BACKGROUND

Age and Geographical Origin

Among the Army PW's in Korea as a whole, the median age at capture was 21 years; the age range extended from 17 to 46 with the highest proportion (58%) falling in the 20-25 year group. Among the Participator, Resister, and Middle PW Groups, the median age at capture was also 21, with differences in the over-all age distributions too small to be regarded as conclusive.

A number of points relating to the geographical origin of the PW's were studied, including, for example, the size of city and the area of the United States in which they lived. No differences among the three criterion Groups were found with respect to most of these items, and for the rest, the differences found were too small to serve as bases for conclusive findings.

Education and Intelligence

Data available concerning the prisoners' educational backgrounds concerned only quantity, and not quality or content. In terms of their level of education, the Army PW's in Korea were distributed in the following way:

Grade school not completed	17%
Grade school completed	27%
Some high school	36%

High school completed	15%
Some college	3%
College completed	1%
Graduate work	1%

The median years of education among Participators and Resisters was virtually the same—9.8 years for Participators and 9.5 years for Resisters. The median for the Middle Group, on the other hand, was lower, 8.8 years, and the distribution of education level among Middle Men is significantly different from the remaining PW's. Almost half of the Middle Group PW's had gone no further than grade school prior to Korea, as compared to roughly a third of the Participators and Resisters (see Figure 7). The ratio of grade school to college educated PW's is roughly three to one among Participators and Resisters; among Middle Men it is 12 to one.

EDUCATION LEVELS AMONG THREE PW GROUPS



Figure 7

Estimates of the prisoners' intelligence were based on scores achieved at induction on the Army General Classification Test (AGCT). These scores, categorized in terms of "Mental Group" levels, are recorded on the Form 20 Personnel Records of enlisted men. Because no AGCT scores were recorded for officers, the data on intelligence reported in Table 4 apply only to enlisted men.

The Middle Group was found to be of lower intelligence than the remaining PW's. The Resister Group contained a smaller proportion of men with below-average intelligence than was found among either Middle Men or Participators.

Civilian Occupation

Considering the findings with regard to education and intelligence, one would expect the Middle Group to come less frequently than other PW's from the white-collar, professional, and student occupation groups. This is borne out by the data, as shown in Table 4. The proportion of

Table 4

INTELLIGENCE LEVEL AND CIVILIAN OCCUPATION AMONG THREE PW GROUPS*

(per cent)

	Participators (N = 227)	Middle (N = 185)	Resisters (N = 127)
Intelligence Level			
Above Average (IQ 111 or higher)	19	17	22
Average (IQ 90-110)	36	30	43
Below Average (IQ 89 or lower)	45	53	35
No information (number of men)	(25)	(23)	(19)
Civilian Occupation			
None	12	17	19
White Collar			
Professional Student	17	8	16
Agriculture	14	24	9
Skilled Semi-skilled	34	26	32
Unskilled	23	25	24
No information (number of men)	(4)	(1)	(0)

*The total number of PW's for whom Army Personnel Forms 20 and 66 were available was 539; results derived from these records are based therefore on 40 cases less than the total sample. The PW's for whom no personnel forms were secured are distributed in fairly even fashion among the three criterion Groups, and there is no reason to believe that the forms were unavailable in any other than random fashion. Thus, no apparent bias is introduced in the analysis of those few items of information derived from Army personnel records.

PW's in the professional–white collar category was half as large in the Middle Group as it was in either of the others; agricultural workers were found in significantly higher proportion among Middle Men than among the remaining PW's.

Other Factors

No difference in marital status was found between the Participators and Resisters; roughly two-thirds of each Group were single men. Among the Middle Group a significantly higher proportion—three-fourths—were unmarried.

In terms of their religious preferences, the differences found among the three Groups are very small and inconclusive. No estimates were available, however, of the degree of religious identity or activity within any given denomination. Such estimates would have been of greater relevance than the simple identification of religious preference.

Army Personnel Records provided two items of information concerning a PW's civilian activities: whether he had entertainment talent, and whether he had engaged in sports prior to his entry into the service (Figure 8). Here again, significant differences are found only between the Middle Group and the remaining PW's. Prisoners in the Middle Group came into the Army with a background of entertainment talent

less frequently than their fellows; sports activities had been engaged in by a smaller proportion of Middle Men than by either Participators or Resisters. The latter finding may, in some measure, be a function of the fact that the Middle Men had less education than their fellows, and thus less occasion to engage in sports activities.



Figure 8

MILITARY BACKGROUND

Rank

With respect to their military rank, the Participators and Resisters are more similar to each other than either is to the Middle Group. This finding is illustrated in Figure 9, where it can be seen that the Middle Group was composed of a higher proportion of enlisted men than either of the two extreme Groups. Men with the rank of corporal are listed here as enlisted men rather than as NCO's.

Although over all, as will be indicated later, pressure was not an important factor in inducing collaboration, this appears to have been somewhat less true for officers than for enlisted men. Among those PW's who came out of internment as Participators, officers had been pressured (threatened and abused) to a greater degree than enlisted men had been. Among Resisters, on the other hand, less pressure had been applied to officers than to enlisted men. From these scant data we may speculate that the captor put considerable pressure on some officers in order to induce participation, and that others, who resisted, were able—perhaps by virtue of their roles in camp (e.g., as physicians)—to avoid punishment more successfully than the enlisted men.

Army Component and Branch

In view of the fact that the Middle Group contained a higher proportion of men of lower rank, it is not surprising that this Group also contained a higher proportion of draftees than did either of the other Groups.

RANK AND ARMY COMPONENT AMONG THREE PW GROUPS



Figure 9

All three Groups were composed primarily of men who went to Korea as members of the Regular Army (see Figure 9). The Resister Group was found to have a significantly higher percentage of men from the Enlisted Reserve than did the remaining Groups; the fact that, on the average, members of the Enlisted Reserve were in captivity for a shorter period than were members of the Regular Army may account, in part, for this resistance record.

No differences were found among the three PW Groups with respect to the Army branches to which they were assigned. Roughly two-thirds of each Group came from the Infantry, and one-eighth from the Artillery. The remainder were spread fairly evenly among eight other branches of the Army.

Military Service

Prior Military Experience. The Middle Group contained a significantly higher proportion than the other two Groups of men with no military service prior to their current tour of duty (see Figure 10).

Years' Service. The Middle Group PW's had had less time in the service than either the Participators or the Resisters. Among the Middle Men, 17 per cent had only two years or less of Army service—including the period of Korean internment—as compared to 9 per cent among Participators and 5 per cent among Resisters. Both the Participator and Resister Groups had larger proportions (26% and 29%) of men with over eight years of service than did the Middle Group (19%).

Foreign Service Prior to Korea. The Middle Group also contained a significantly higher proportion of men whose foreign service prior to arrival in Korea was of short duration (less than one month) than did either the Participator or Resister Groups; the Resisters had seen more foreign service than either of the other two Groups, and also came to Korea earlier than the remaining PW's.

PRIOR MILITARY SERVICE AMONG THREE PW GROUPS



Figure 10

Prior Combat. Twenty-one per cent of the Participators and 24 per cent of the Resisters had seen combat prior to Korea; a significantly smaller percentage of Middle Men (14%) had done so.

Decorations

A larger proportion of Resisters (25%) had been decorated by the Army prior to internment than was the case for either Middle (15%) or Participator (13%) PW's. The hypothesis that the difference could be accounted for by the fact that Resisters had seen more foreign service than other PW's was tested by comparing the proportions of decorated PW's among subgroups differing in their terms of foreign duty. Resisters were found to be more frequently decorated than other PW's irrespective of the duration of their foreign service. It would appear that those PW's classified as Resisters tended more frequently to act in a "meritorious" fashion even prior to internment.

VITAL STATISTICS ON CAPTURE AND INTERNMENT

Capture

Division and Regiment. PW's who became Participators, Middle Men, and Resisters were compared in terms of the fighting units to which they were assigned at the time of their capture. When compared with respect both to the divisions and to the regiments from which they came, the differences found were too small to be regarded as conclusive.

Duty When Captured. No conclusive differences appeared when the three PW Groups were contrasted on the basis of the military duties they performed at the time of capture. This applies to specific duties as well as to the more gross categorizations of front-line versus support functions.

Date of Capture. Differences found among the criterion Groups when they were compared in terms of the period in which they were captured are shown in Table 5. The Middle Group (having come to Korea later than the other PW's) had a higher proportion of men captured after January 1951 than did the remaining Groups combined.

Table 5

DATE OF CAPTURE AMONG THREE PW GROUPS

(per cent)

Date of Capture	Participators (N = 238)	Middle (N = 203)	Resisters (N = 138)
July 1950 - September 1950	10	8	9
October 1950 - December 1950	58	43	49
January 1951 - June 1951	26	35	35
July 1951 or later	6	14	7
No information (number of men)	(4)	(4)	(2)

The period October-December 1950 saw the entry of the Chinese into the Korean War, and the subsequent capture of by far the largest proportion of Army troops. It was during this period, too, that the death rate among newly taken PW's reached 50 per cent, as the North Koreans—an Army which had been in full retreat—showed little care for the survival of PW's under conditions of extreme hardship. Except for the relatively small number of prisoners held by the Chinese at a temporary camp known as "Peaceful Valley," soldiers captured during that period suffered the severest sort of deprivation. A higher proportion of men captured at that time became Participators than became Resisters or Middle Men. Over all, as will be shown subsequently, the evacuation period of the Participators was no more stressful than that experienced by other PW's. There is no telling, however, how this initial experience in captivity was perceived by the PW's; the possibility that Participators viewed their evacuation experiences as more traumatic than other PW's could not be tested in this research.

Circumstances of Capture. Data were collected on the following aspects of each prisoner's capture experience:

Was he wounded or not wounded?

Was he captured alone or with others?

Does he attribute a "snafu" situation (lack of ammunition, faulty leadership, etc.) as the cause of his capture, or does he not?

When the three PW Groups are compared in these terms, the differences revealed are small and inconclusive.

Internment

Length of Evacuation Period. The three PW Groups do not differ in terms of the length of time spent between capture and arrival in the first permanent camp.

Length of Internment. A comparison of the number of months spent in internment by the three PW Groups reflects the findings with regard to date of capture, described earlier. The Middle Group was in captivity for a shorter time than either Participators or Resisters.

Chapter 4

ANALYSES OF RATING SCALE DATA

THE RATING SCALES

Over-all estimates on important factors descriptive of the prisoners' experiences, traits, and behaviors in internment were obtained through use of 27 rating scales. (One scale, measuring the treatment expected by the PW's, was dropped because of insufficient data.) The factors covered by these scales and the interpretations of high and low ratings for each are reported in Table 6. The words "degree of" should be understood to precede the titles for each factor.

Table 6

RATING SCALES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION

Scale		Interpretation	
		Low Rating	High Rating
1	Stress in Evacuation	Little	A great deal
2	Threat in Interrogation	Little	A great deal
3	Abuse in Interrogation	Little	A great deal
4	Threat in Indoctrination	Little	A great deal
5	Abuse in Indoctrination	Little	A great deal
6	Over-All Pressure (Threat and Mistreatment)	Little	A great deal
7	Adequacy of Medical Care	Adequate	Inadequate
8	Illness in Internment	No illness	Considerable illness
9	Contrast in Treatment Between Evacuation and First Camp	Evacuation worse	Evacuation better
10	Preferential Treatment Received	Little	A great deal
11	Special Inducements Received	Little	A great deal
12	Contact With Outside World	Little	A great deal
13	Interrogation	Little	A great deal
14	Indoctrination	Little	A great deal
15	Concern for Other PW's	Little	A great deal
16	Encouragement Given Other PW's to Resist	Little	A great deal
17	Association With Other PW's	In groups	Alone
18	Friendliness Toward Participators Upon Repatriation	Hostile	Friendly
19	Friendliness Toward Resisters Upon Repatriation	Hostile	Friendly
20	Susceptibility to Threats	Not susceptible	Very susceptible

(Continued)

Table 6 *(Continued)*

RATING SCALES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION

Scale		Interpretation	
		Low Rating	High Rating
21	Susceptibility to Inducements	Not susceptible	Very susceptible
22	Opportunism	Not opportunistic	Very opportunistic
23	Acceptance of Communism	Little	A great deal
24	Friendliness Toward Captor Upon Repatriation	Hostile	Friendly
25	Contribution to Enemy Propaganda	Little	A great deal
26	Participation	Weak	Strong

The ratings assigned on any given scale were based on relevant information found in a prisoner's dossier. Thus, for example, a high rating for a given PW on the Interrogation Scale reflected the presence of considerable evidence that that prisoner had been subjected to frequent and intensive interrogations during captivity; likewise, a low rating on the Acceptance of Communism Scale meant that there was little evidence in that PW's dossier of a personal acceptance of the captor's ideological teachings. Each scale contained six points, each point bearing a distinct qualitative definition.[1] For purposes of statistical analysis, numbers from "1" through "6" were assigned as quantitative definitions of each scale point.

In order to fully understand a number of the major findings to be reported subsequently, it is important to keep in mind the criteria which were used in establishing prisoners' ratings on the following scales:

(1) Preferential Treatment (Scale 10). The degree of preferential treatment which a prisoner received in captivity was gauged from dossier data indicating simply how much and how frequently such treatment was received from the captor; the receipt of offers of preferential treatment was not taken into account here. Data indicating the degree to which a man actually had been the recipient of, for example, better food or easier jobs than his fellows were the sole bases for establishing his rating on this scale.

(2) Susceptibility to Inducements (Scale 21). This scale was used to determine not how many rewards a PW actually received, but how he reacted to those which he did receive or those which were offered. Thus, a given dossier may have provided data indicating that a PW received a very large amount of preferential treatment; yet, unless there was evidence that such treatment operated for him as an inducement to participate, his rating on the susceptibility scale would be low. On the other hand, a PW may never have actually received any preferential treatment; yet, if there were data showing that he was induced to participate because of offers of special treatment, his rating on the susceptibility scale would be high. In effect, then, the criteria

[1]See example on page 28.

for judgment employed in assigning ratings on Scales 10 and 21 are highly independent.[1]

(3) Participation (Scale 26). This scale served to contrast PW's in terms of the degree to which they participated with the enemy, for whatever reason. Thus, a man who frequently signed petitions, made recordings, and informed on his fellows—all only after severe physical abuse—was given a higher rating on this scale than another man who simply made a recording because he was promised a reward. The reasons for, or circumstances in which, acts of participation were committed were irrelevant here; only the extent of participation behavior itself was taken into account. It can be seen that a PW could have had a relatively high rating on susceptibility to inducements by virtue of the fact that all of his participation behavior was due to this factor; yet, this same PW conceivably may have had a relatively low rating on the participation scale simply because his over-all extent of participation was less than that of his fellows. To a very high degree, then, the sources of data for Scales 21 and 26 are also mutually independent.

The complete rating scale data (i.e., the numerical ratings for all scales) were subjected to correlational analyses as a means for determining (1) the degree of relationship between various PW traits and experiences and (2) the degree of the prisoners' participation behavior. The results, summarized in this section, were used primarily in deciding which of the many coded items of information derived from the dossiers deserved the greatest emphasis in subsequent analyses. For example, the fact that no strong relationship was found between the Stress in Evacuation and Degree of Participation scales led to the decision to devote relatively little analytic time to dossier data describing the kinds of mistreatments or atrocities experienced in the evacuation period. Similarly, the fact that Degree of Preferential Treatment was found to be highly related to prisoner behavior indicated that all data descriptive of the amount and kinds of rewards received by the PW's deserved relatively intensive analyses.

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG THE SCALES

The degree of relationship between any two rating scales can be established from the matrix of intercorrelations shown in Table 7.[2] In studying these correlation coefficients, it should be kept in mind that the values are a quantitative representation of the simple interrelationships among the rating-scale factors. In technical terms, these are "zero order" correlations (computed here by the Pearson Product

[1]The same is true for Scales 6 and 20. Scale 6 measures the degree of abuse and threat received from the captor; Scale 20 estimates the degree to which threats served as an *inducement to cooperate*, independent of the actual extent to which a PW was threatened.

[2]In terms of absolute size, a correlation coefficient (r) may vary from +1.00 through zero to −1.00; positive correlations indicate various degrees of positive relationship between two variables, a correlation near zero in either a positive or negative direction indicates the absence of virtually any relationship, and negative correlations indicate various degrees of inverse relation between two variables.

Table 7

INTERCORRELATIONS[a] AMONG 26 RATING SCALES

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	
Stress in Evacuation	1		13	10	24	14	29	25	39	-43	-15	-09	-09	02	-02	28	17	-01	-15	07	-12	-25	-12	-18	-23	-13	-18	1
Threat in Interrogation	2			45	17	17	44	-78	08	16	-12	-02	-06	42	-03	27	26	-03	-18	16	-15	-21	-19	-07	-18	-10	-21	2
Abuse in Interrogation	3				16	16	39	14	09	14	-14	-09	-03	37	-07	17	26	-02	-13	07	-22	-27	-21	-10	-12	-10	-21	3
Threat in Indoctrination	4					35	51	27	22	15	-11	-07	03	11	10	33	35	-22	-21	20	-19	-28	-15	-13	-21	-04	-18	4
Abuse in Indoctrination	5						59	26	07	27	-19	-15	-04	11	-05	35	45	-13	-22	31	-28	-29	-30	-15	-26	-16	-34	5
Over-All Pressure	6							35	19	36	-36	-25	-09	30	-12	47	53	-05	-44	35	-44	-47	-37	-07	-43	-32	-53	6
Inadequacy of Medical Care	7								31	11	-49	-46	-03	00	-24	30	33	-16	-44	24	41	-54	-45	-41	-34	-45	-45	7
Illness in Internment	8									-13	-02	-02	-10	07	01	09	04	06	-10	-05	-04	-13	-03	-04	-14	-05	-06	8
Degree Evacuation Better Than First Camp	9										-27	-21	-03	17	-15	19	36	-09	-22	25	-31	-29	-34	-15	-20	-26	-34	9
Preferential Treatment Received	10											84	11	-04	57	-37	-48	05	61	-52	72	85	79	64	55	81	81	10
Special Inducements Received	11												05	05	58	-34	-31	12	59	-46	67	80	68	59	51	75	74	11
Contact With Outside World	12													00	14	-01	-09	-04	19	-07	07	11	15	03	07	11	11	12
Interrogation	13														09	19	20	-11	-08	17	-15	-05	-11	00	-09	-04	-13	13
Indoctrination	14															-21	-30	-03	43	-31	40	54	52	46	40	59	55	14
Concern for Other PW's	15																69	-35	-33	48	-55	-52	-52	-27	-41	-37	-57	15
Encouragement Given Other PW's to Resist	16																	-28	-49	53	-66	-75	-67	-33	-46	-51	-74	16
Aloneness	17																		10	-33	16	20	07	13	11	02	14	17
Friendliness Toward Participators Upon Repatriation	18																			-44	60	69	56	32	68	61	65	18
Friendliness Toward Resisters Upon Repatriation	19																				00	-58	-45	-48	-54	-45	-56	19
Susceptibility to Threats	20																					86	76	48	44	74	83	20
Susceptibility to Inducements	21																						83	53	55	80	86	21
Opportunism	22																							45	46	77	86	22
Acceptance of Communism	23																								61	58	55	23
Friendliness Toward Captor Upon Repatriation	24																									52	58	24
Contribution to Enemy Propaganda	25																										85	25
Participation	26																											26

[a]Decimals properly preceding entries have been omitted.

Moment method), which do not necessarily indicate the unique relationship between any two factors. In this instance, a positive correlation between two rating scales, such as Indoctrination (14) and Participation (26), may very well be due to the fact that each of these correlates positively with a third scale, such as Susceptibility to Inducements (21). It should be remembered also that no cause and effect relationship is indicated by a correlation coefficient, but only the degree to which changes in one variable are accompanied by changes in another. Cause and effect relationships will be discussed later in this report, but they will be inferred from information quite distinct from correlational data, which tell only the direction and degree of association between any two factors.

Before the general pattern of findings derived from the analysis of the rating-scale intercorrelations is indicated, it should be pointed out that two of these scales (25 and 26) represent criterion measures (that is to say, measures of that dependent variable—prisoner behavior—which this study attempts to "predict"). The remaining scales (1-24) represent the "predictors," or independent variables, whose degrees of interrelatedness with the criteria were especially sought. The correlations between each of the independent variables and the criterion scales, as well as the pattern of interrelationships among the independent variables themselves, served as a point of departure for the selection of a smaller number of factors to be analyzed more thoroughly through more sensitive correlation techniques.

Interpretation of Correlation Size

Given the size of the sample utilized in this study, a correlation coefficient greater than $\pm .05$ is statistically significant at the $< .10$ probability level; that is, the likelihood of its occurrence by chance alone is less than 10 in 100. In interpreting the relative significance of the rating-scale correlation coefficients, it would be useless to apply only this criterion of statistical reliability, for all but a few of the correlations exceed $\pm .05$ in value. A more useful framework in which correlation size may be interpreted is in terms of the "coefficient of determination," or r^2, which, when multiplied by 100, gives the percentage of variance in one variable associated with, or accounted for, by the other. As a rough standard, then, for interpreting the significance of the correlation coefficients, the scheme outlined in Table 8 may be used.

Table 8

INTERPRETATION OF CORRELATION COEFFICIENT SIZE

Correlation Coefficient (r)	Interpretation	
	Variance Explained	Qualitative Evaluation
.90 - 1.00	81% - 100%	Very high
.78 - .89	61% - 80%	High
.64 - .77	41% - 60%	Moderate
.46 - .63	21% - 40%	Low
.00 - .45	0% - 20%	Very low

Relationship Between the Two Criteria

The correlation between the two prisoner behavior scales—degree of Contribution to Enemy Propaganda (25) and degree of over-all Participation (26)—is a high, positive one ($r = .85$), indicating that a large proportion of participation behavior is accounted for by acts in internment by which the PW's aided the enemy's psychological warfare effort. Because this relationship is so strongly positive, and because—as can be seen by studying columns 25 and 26 of the correlation matrix—factors which correlate with one of the criteria correlate in the same direction and to roughly the same degree with the other, references to the "criterion" which follow will refer only to Participation (Scale 26).

Correlations Between Predictors and Criterion

Four factors were found to bear a high, positive relationship with participation. That is, the greater the degree of the prisoners' participation with the captor (Scale 26), the greater was their

- Susceptibility to inducements (21)
- Opportunism (22)
- Susceptibility to threat (20)
- Receipt of preferential treatment (10)

Moderately high, positive relationship was found for

- Receipt of special inducements (11)
- Friendliness toward Participators (18)

Low, positive relationship was found for

- Friendliness toward captor (24)
- Indoctrination (14)
- Acceptance of Communism (23)

Very low, positive relationship was found for

- Contacts with outside world (12)
- Association with other PW's (17)

One factor was found to bear a moderately high, negative relationship with participation. That is, the greater the degree of the prisoners' participation (Scale 26), the less was their

- Encouragement of other PW's to resist (16)

Low, negative relationship was found for

- Pressure endured (6)
- Friendliness to Resisters (19)
- Concern for other PW's (15)

Very low, negative relationship was found for

- Stress in evacuation (1)
- Threat in interrogation (2)
- Abuse in interrogation (3)
- Threat in indoctrination (4)
- Abuse in indoctrination (5)
- Inadequacy of medical care (7)
- Degree evacuation better than first camp (9)
- Interrogation (13)

Intercorrelations Among the Independent Factors

In order to select a smaller number of factors for more intensive correlational analysis, it was necessary to study not only the relative sizes of correlations between the predictor factors and the criterion but also patterns of relationship among the predictors (Scales 1-24) themselves. Especially sought were factors whose correlations with the criterion were high, and whose correlations with other predictors were low. Such a pattern would indicate a unique, or "uncontaminated," relationship with the criterion. As an example of the method used in eliminating factors from the subsequent correlational analysis, we may look at the data for Scales 20, 21, and 22. The intercorrelations among these scales are:

Scale		20	21	22
20	Susceptibility to Threat		.86	.76
21	Susceptibility to Inducements			.83
22	Opportunism			

It can be seen readily that the scales are highly interrelated to one another. The next problem, then, was to compare the degrees to which each correlated with the criteria, Scales 25 and 26:

Scale		25 Contributed to Propaganda	26 Participation
20	Susceptibility to Threat	.74	.83
21	Susceptibility to Inducements	.80	.86
22	Opportunism	.77	.86

Again, each of the three predictors is related in a strong, positive fashion to the criterion scales. It was possible, in view of these patterns, to drop two of the factors from consideration in subsequent correlation analysis. Of the three, Scale 21, measuring susceptibility to inducements, was retained because of its slightly higher correlation with Scale 25.

In addition to the procedures already described, the utility, or meaningfulness, of the factors was taken into account. It would be of relatively little value to know more about the relationship between participation behavior and the degree of friendliness expressed by PW's to the captor after repatriation; on the other hand, a factor describing associations with other prisoners is one we would like to know more about in relation to the degree of participation shown in internment. In this context, then, a careful survey of the patterns of interrelationship—among the predictor scales on the one hand and between the predictors and criteria on the other—resulted in the selection of 10 predictor scales (listed in Table 9) to serve as a basis for the higher-order correlation analyses described below.

Beta and Multiple Correlation Analyses

A Beta coefficient measures the degree of relationship between two variables with the effects of other variables held constant. In this instance we want to know the unique association between each of 10 predictor factors and participation behavior. What, for example, is the relationship between the degree of acceptance of Communism and participation behavior—ruling out the effects of nine other factors which themselves are related to some degree to both acceptance of Communism and prisoner behavior? This question was answered, as indicated earlier, for 10 of the factors covered by the rating scales, separately in terms of the unique association each has with degree of Contribution to Enemy Propaganda (Scale 25) and degree of Participation (Scale 26). The results of this analysis are reported in Table 9.

Table 9

BETA COEFFICIENTS FOR 10 FACTORS AND PARTICIPATION BEHAVIOR

Rating Scales	25 Contributions to Propaganda	26 Degree of Participation
1 Stress in Evacuation	.03	.07
3 Abuse in Interrogation	.11	.07
4 Threat in Indoctrination	.16	.15
6 Over-All Pressure	-.10	-.26
10 Preferential Treatment Received	.21	.14
13 Interrogation	-.04	-.05
14 Indoctrination	.10	.04
15 Concern for Other PW's	.01	-.15
21 Susceptibility to Inducements	.52	.52
23 Acceptance of Communism	.16	.15
Multiple Correlation (R)	.86	.91

The major findings, important in themselves but used primarily as indicators of those portions of the data to be analyzed intensively, are as follows:

(1) Independently of the remaining factors studied, Susceptibility to Inducements (Scale 21) bears by far the highest relationship to the criterion. This factor was found also to have the highest zero-order correlation with participation behavior (r = .86).[1]

(2) Among the remaining factors—considering the results of both the partial and zero-order correlation analyses—the following scales are most strongly associated with participation behavior: Pressure (6), Preferential Treatment (10), Concern for Fellow PW's (15), and Acceptance of Communism (23). In the case of Pressure (6) and Concern for Fellow PW's (15) the relationships are negative.

Having broken down the 10 factors listed in Table 9 in terms of their unique association with the criteria, it is of considerable interest to put them together, so to speak, and determine the sum of their associations

[1]See pages 52 and 53 for a full description of the basis for ratings on Scales 21 and 26.

with participation behavior. This is accomplished by means of a multiple correlation ($\underline{R}$) which takes into account the possibility that variations in one factor (in this case, participation behavior) may be due to variations in a number of other factors, all acting jointly (in this case, the 10 factors of Table 9). The $\underline{R}$ between the latter and Propaganda Contributions (Scale 25) is .86; between the 10 factors and Participation (Scale 26) the $\underline{R}$ is .91, indicating that all these independent variables, acting together, account for over 80 per cent of the variance of participation behavior. This is an unusually high multiple correlation and suggests that the 10 rating scales selected for partial and multiple correlational analysis do, in fact, include factors important in the context of this study.

Chapter 5

INTERROGATION AND INDOCTRINATION

INTERROGATION

Degree

All but 3 per cent of the PW's returned from Korea had been interrogated to some extent by their captors. (The few cases studied who experienced no interrogation are in the Middle and Resister Groups.) The degree of interrogation experienced by the three prisoner Groups is shown in Figure 11; these data take into account the extent, or number, of interrogations experienced as well as their intensity, or length.



Figure 11

The Resisters were found to have been interrogated to a greater degree than either of the other Groups. This difference is accounted for in large measure by the fact that Resisters were interrogated a greater number of times than other PW's. One-fourth of the non-Resisters were interrogated only once, as compared to 10 per cent of the Resisters. The proportions of PW's interrogated four or more times were 31 per cent among Participators, 27 per cent among Middle Men, and 40 per cent among Resisters. The most common number of separate interrogations among the PW's as a whole was two (experienced by 28%), although 18 per cent had five or more. The number reached 100 or more only in the cases of a small number (4%) of

Resisters. Data regarding the length of separate interrogations were not available with sufficient frequency to warrant tabulation, but of at least equal significance are data describing pressures endured by the PW's during their interrogations.

Threat and Abuse

How much threat did the captor exert on the PW's in demanding cooperation during the interrogation procedures? How much actual abuse? Table 10 answers these questions for the three prisoner Groups. Again the Resisters were found to be atypical; they were both threatened and abused more than the other PW's. This finding, taken together with the fact that Resisters were interrogated more than others, would indicate that even in the early periods of internment those PW's classified as Resisters yielded much less readily than others to the captor's demands—in this case, to his interrogation questions.

Table 10

THREAT AND ABUSE IN INTERROGATION AMONG THREE PW GROUPS

(per cent)

Type of Pressure	Participators (N = 238)	Middle (N = 203)	Resisters (N = 138)
Degree of threat			
Great	3	2	11
Moderate	16	22	20
Little	12	15	21
None	69	61	48
No information (number of men)	(29)	(17)	(10)
Degree of abuse			
Great	(a)	0	10
Moderate	4	8	5
Little	9	8	10
None	87	84	75
No information (number of men)	(28)	(15)	(13)

[a]Less than 0.5%.

Of interest also is the finding that among all Groups, the captor used considerably more threat than actual abuse. Thirty-eight per cent of all PW's were threatened to some degree, but only 16 per cent were ever abused or mistreated in interrogation. Of all PW's threatened in interrogation to any degree, only 40 per cent were also abused.

Type and Content

Interrogation was both verbal and written, although the verbal type was much more frequent. Sixty per cent of the PW's were interrogated only verbally, 4 per cent only in written form, and the remainder in both ways. No differences in this connection are found among the three prisoner Groups.

Quite apart from the general interrogation procedures, prisoners were required to provide autobiographical information in written form. These autobiographies usually followed an outline prescribed by the captor, and included information regarding the prisoner's personal background, family history, social and military history, and political affiliations. (The specificity of information required is illustrated by the autobiographical item asking for names and addresses of relatives in the United States.) Autobiographies were written by 91 per cent of all PW's in Korea, in roughly equal proportions by the three Groups studied. In describing these personal histories, the returning prisoners gave little evidence of insight into the value the data had for the enemy. Many prisoners viewed these data as innocuous, and few saw that in the hands of the captor items of personal information could (and did) serve as a springboard for later pressures to cooperate.

In his interrogations proper the captor covered a wide range of subject matter, from questions regarding the prisoners' political and psychological attitudes to questions of military tactics and strategy. Three-fourths of all PW's reported being interrogated regarding their personal and family backgrounds, although from the dossier data it is not clear exactly how many referred only to the written autobiographies. The indications are, however, that in most instances personal background information was pursued at a verbal level as well as in writing. Half of the PW's were questioned about matters dealing with Tables of Organization and Equipment, Army organization techniques, and other military unit data. One-fourth were interrogated about military equipment and supplies, and 15 per cent about Army tactics and strategy. Forty per cent reported being asked their name, rank, and serial number; only isolated cases—less than 0.5 per cent—reported being asked only for this information. Political attitudes and general attitudinal data were pursued with 13 per cent of the prisoners, and only a small number (3%) were questioned in formal interrogations about internal camp organizations and escape activities. On the average, each PW was questioned on roughly three (2.7) of the categories of information described above, with no differences in this respect among the Participator, Middle, and Resister Groups.

Differences among the three Groups do appear when they are contrasted in terms of the content of their interrogations. Resisters reported being interrogated less frequently than other PW's regarding their personal background and attitudes and on name, rank, and serial number; they reported being interrogated more frequently than others on items of military hardware and tactics and strategy. It should not be inferred from these results that those PW's from whom the enemy more frequently got personal data tended to participate. A number of alternative and more compelling interpretations can be given for this finding, among them the reluctance of non-Resisters to report being questioned about information of more obvious intelligence value to the enemy, this as a defensive reaction. Or it may be that the data on this score are entirely valid, but that the captor, having first obtained military-intelligence data with relatively little effort from the non-Resisters, was able to proceed to matters of personal background; data

discussed earlier in this section would indicate that progress in interrogation of Resisters was relatively slower for the enemy.

Branch Given Most Attention

Half of the returning PW's agreed that the captor showed most interest in interrogating members of the Intelligence Branch, who were viewed, no doubt, as the possessors of the most vital military information.

INDOCTRINATION

Degree

Ninety-seven per cent of all Army PW's were subjected to indoctrination of one type or another. Those few who came through internment without indoctrination were captured, for the most part, in the spring and early summer of 1953, just a few months before the end of the war. A comparison of the degree of indoctrination (again, extent and intensity) received by the three PW Groups studied is presented in Figure 12.



Figure 12

Among all PW's the most frequent length of indoctrination was from one year to 18 months. The Participators are found to have received more indoctrination than the other two Groups. The Resisters, whose over-all length of internment was similar to that of the Participators, were subjected to indoctrination for fewer months than were Participators. Fifty-six per cent of the Resisters had only one year or less of indoctrination, as against 38 per cent of the Participators and 35 per cent of the Middle Group (whose over-all internment was of shorter duration). Among Resisters only 9 per cent had two years or more of indoctrination, as compared to 21 per cent among Participators. Data

describing the length of the indoctrination sessions themselves and the numbers of hours per week spent in indoctrination activities were not available with sufficient regularity to warrant tabulation and analysis.

Before the pressures exerted by the captor in demanding cooperation in his indoctrination efforts are described, the meaning of the relationship between degree of indoctrination and prisoner behavior should be clarified. The fact that Participators received more indoctrination than Resisters should not be taken to mean that a greater exposure to the enemy's ideological teachings caused men to participate. As a matter of fact, available evidence reveals the reverse to be more nearly true: The more a PW participated, the more likely he was to receive indoctrination. Once a PW demonstrated that he was cooperative, in behavior at required indoctrination sessions as well as in his general behavior, special indoctrination procedures were provided for him on a voluntary basis. It is this voluntary phase of the indoctrination that accounts for the differences in degree of indoctrination just described. These data will be presented more fully as part of a subsequent discussion of types of indoctrination experienced by the PW's.

Threat and Abuse

Pressures exerted by the captor in demanding participation in the indoctrination program were considerably greater for Resisters than for other prisoners. As shown in Table 11, this applies equally to threats and abuse. Indoctrination procedures of various types played a large role in the routine of camp activity, and for those PW's who chose to do so, it was easy enough to "act" cooperative even in the absence of a sincere acceptance of the enemy's teachings. It was primarily among Resisters that the captor found it difficult to secure even this degree of cooperation, thus the greater pressures on this group to conform. Harassing the Chinese indoctrinators, creating disturbances during lectures,

Table 11

THREAT AND ABUSE IN INDOCTRINATION AMONG THREE PW GROUPS

(per cent)

Type of Pressure	Participators (N = 238)	Middle (N = 203)	Resisters (N = 138)
Degree of Threat			
Great	2	1	10
Moderate	12	9	20
Little	17	24	21
None	69	66	49
No information (number of men)	(20)	(22)	(12)
Degree of Abuse			
Great	2	1	21
Moderate	6	6	12
Little	7	14	15
None	85	79	52
No information (number of men)	(22)	(17)	(7)

petitioning for a reduction in the number of classes—these were some of the ways in which Resisters showed themselves to be uncooperative, thus "inviting" reprisals.

Although data in this connection were infrequently available, the most typical description of the Participators' response to indoctrination was "cooperative for personal gain." This is not to say that some Participators did not "buy" the indoctrination content. Some did, as will be shown later. By and large, however, it was a matter of expediency; personal comfort and the avoidance of pressure were the immediate rewards for taking the indoctrination program "seriously."

Comparison of the proportions of PW's in the three Groups who were threatened in indoctrination and who were abused reveals differences which throw additional light on participation and resistance behavior in indoctrination. The ratio of threatened to abused Participators is 2.2 to one and among Middle Men it is 1.6 to one; among Resisters the ratio is reversed, with one Resister threatened for every 1.2 Resisters abused. It would seem that the captor had occasion less often to act on his threats in dealing with Participators than in dealing with Resisters. For the latter Group, threats were an inadequate stimulus for generating compliance with the captor's demands for participation in the indoctrination program; of those Resisters threatened in indoctrination, 77 per cent were also abused. For Participators threats were evidently more effective; only 39 per cent of those threatened in indoctrination were also abused. The Middle Group falls between the two extremes.

Methods and Techniques

The most common method used by the captor in indoctrination was the simple lecture, experienced by 98 per cent of the PW's. Eighty-three per cent were required to attend group study periods, usually conducted following the lecture sessions as part of the regular regimen of indoctrination. Almost half (43%) of the PW's attended smaller discussion groups, or "conferences," held at various intervals, and 27 per cent took part in "spontaneous" public gatherings called by the captor. Beyond these, the captor used less frequently such subsidiary methods as discussion groups run entirely by the prisoners themselves (9%), special, or voluntary, study groups (11%) and personal, individual contacts (4%), and "training aids" such as propaganda movies (25%), plays, posters, pictures, exhibits, charts, and recordings.

Differences between Participators and Resisters appear only with respect to those methods in which the initiative for indoctrination activity rested with the PW's. Lectures, required study periods and conferences, all of them entirely controlled by the captor, were attended no more frequently by Participators than Resisters. As a matter of fact, conferences were held more frequently with Resisters (50%) than with Participators (36%). But having singled out the most cooperative PW's, the captor subjected these men to special indoctrination, in a relatively free environment in which participation was voluntary. Thus we find, for example, that voluntary study groups were attended by 53 per cent of the Participators, only 4 per cent of the Middle Group, and one per cent of the Resisters.

Not all of the returning PW's gave estimates of the most effective indoctrination techniques utilized by the captor. Data relevant to this question apply to only 59 per cent of the PW's; 25 per cent provided no information and another 16 percent reported that no techniques were effective. With proportions based on those who mentioned at least one technique, we find that the two methods most frequently named as most effective are those in which there was the most direct captor-to-PW contact—lectures (45%) and personal contacts (17%). As far as teaching aids are concerned, books and library work were mentioned by 28 per cent of the PW's, over three times as often as magazines or movies, the only other aids considered effective by over 5 per cent of the PW's.

Type Given Most Attention

Seventy-eight per cent of the PW's named at least one type of prisoner on whom they believed the captor concentrated his indoctrination efforts. Almost half (47%) of these named "younger" PW's as a special target. Others named by 5 per cent or more are the more highly educated (22%), the less educated (21%), members of minority groups (22%), those showing interest in Communism (11%), those of lower rank (10%), those from lower socio-economic levels (6%), and emotionally weak prisoners (6%). The proportions naming these groups are roughly equal among the three PW Groups.

In contrasting the degree of indoctrination received by PW's at various age levels, we find the greatest proportion of highly indoctrinated PW's in the 26-29-year group and the lowest in the teen-age and 30-and-above groups.

Themes Stressed

In general, the themes of the social and economic merits of Communism and the sins of American capitalism were stressed most heavily in indoctrination. "What Communism had done for China" and the well-being of the Russian farmer were contrasted with the "exploitation" of the American worker and social discrimination in the United States; the "peaceful intentions" of the Communist world were detailed against a backdrop of American "aggression," germ warfare atrocities, and corruption in politics and government; instruction in the "idealistic" lives of famous Communist personalities such as Stalin, Marx, Lenin, and Mao was presented together with descriptions of the "warmongering" dispositions of Roosevelt, Truman, and the "Wall Street Capitalists." The indoctrinators hit closer to the immediate concerns of the PW's by proclaiming also the uselessness of the Korean war as a concrete demonstration, along with the occupation of Formosa by the 7th Fleet, of the American propensity for "starting imperialistic wars for the benefit of the minority ruling class." The degree to which these ideas contributed to an acceptance of Communism is described later in this report.

The captor made a special, concerted attempt to persuade Army PW's that the United States had used bacteriological warfare techniques during the Korean hostilities. Eighty-two per cent of the PW's heard

BW lectures, Participators (92%) more often than other PW's (81%). These were given primarily by the Chinese themselves (to 85% of those who heard lectures), and less frequently by other Army PW's (to 19%) and Air Force prisoners (to 10%).

Again, special attention was given (or, perhaps, volunteered by) the Participators. Twenty-four per cent of this Group were lectured on BW by Air Force "confessor" personnel, as against 7 per cent in the other two Groups. It is significant that only 3 per cent of all PW's—primarily Participators—were allowed to have personal talks with these Air Force PW's. The avoidance by the captor of this personal, informal approach when, in his over-all indoctrination efforts, such techniques were more widely used, should have indicated to the Army PW's that their lecturers were not entirely convinced of their text. Less than one half of one per cent of the Army PW's themselves gave BW lectures, and all of those who did were Participators.

News Sources

Very much a part of the indoctrination program was the heavy diet of Communist news received by the PW's, in contrast to the virtual absence of non-Communist news sources. All but a handful of the Army PW's were exposed to enemy news media during their internment; 99 per cent were given enemy-sponsored newspapers or magazines. Among these men 93 per cent reported seeing Chinese publications and 83 per cent U.S. Communist publications; equally large proportions reported seeing Russian and English Communist newspapers and magazines. Additional publications came from satellite countries, India, and various Western European countries. Frequently these were required reading, but they were also available in plentiful numbers for those who cared to read in their leisure. Communist radio broadcasts were received by 85 per cent of the PW's; among these men 98 per cent heard broadcasts from Peiping and 25 per cent from Moscow. (Radio broadcasts from North Korea are reported very infrequently.) Communist books, broadcasts over the camp PA system, and contacts with Communist news correspondents supplemented the diet of propagandistic news provided for the prisoners.

In contrast, only 11 per cent of the PW's received non-Communist news of any type during their internment, in equal proportions among the three Groups studied. Over half of these (57%) received innocuous sports and local news clippings sent in letters from home, 20 per cent received non-Communist magazines sent from the United States, 5 per cent got non-Communist books. Small handfuls of PW's heard unbiased news broadcasts on PW-built radios or received information on happenings in the outside world via friendly psychological warfare leaflets (1%). For the most part the contents of the news delivered via these media were unrelated to the Communist indoctrination "line" heard by the PW's through enemy news sources.

There was next to nothing in the environment of the prisoners to break the unrelenting stream of propaganda provided by the captor. Letters from home could conceivably have broken the pattern, but these

were received infrequently. Six per cent of the PW's got none; of the remainder, 42 per cent received less than 30 letters during their internment, and those irregularly, at the discretion of the captor. Only a few PW's reported that their letters were neither read nor censored by the captor, and 70 per cent reported having direct evidence of censorship of their mail. Participators received more mail than other PW's, probably as one of their rewards for cooperation. The prisoners were severely restricted, too, as far as the contents of their outgoing mail were concerned. Seventy-one per cent reported being limited as to the number of letters they could send, 66 per cent were told to write only about the "good treatment" they were receiving, and 45 per cent were instructed to appeal for peace in Korea. Only 5 per cent reported being allowed to prepare letters as they pleased.

A great deal of evidence from basic psychological research indicates that when an individual is subjected to a homogeneous flow of opinion and news, there is a tendency for him to modify his own opinions—even to reject known facts—and conform to the group. Returning PW's frequently reported that in the restricted environment of prison camp they soon began to doubt what they knew to be true. Some of them felt the need to check with new prisoners to find out whether the captor was really telling them the truth in his news reports, and others said that one of the first things they wanted to do after liberation was to validate or reject the news they had been getting. Under the circumstances in Korea, it is not surprising to find PW's doubting their own opinions and facts; this is a natural outgrowth of the intensity of one-way news and opinion presented by the enemy, and of the deprivation by the enemy of any normal news stimuli that might have reached the PW's.

Suggestions for Post-Release Activities

That the captor did not view his indoctrination efforts as ending with the end of the war is apparent from the fact that 15 per cent of the PW's were given suggestions for Communist-oriented activity to be carried on after their release.

Among Participators, 32 per cent were given such suggestions, while among Resisters and Middle alike only 12 per cent were approached. Primarily the captor was interested in having PW's join Communist organizations, "fight for peace," and read suggested Communist publications.

Chapter 6

ACCEPTANCE OF COMMUNISM

The attitudes toward Communist ideology expressed by returning Army PW's, and the relationships between these attitudes and participation behavior will be discussed in this chapter.

A breakdown of the prisoner population in terms of the degree to which they were found to be sympathetic toward Communism as a way of life is presented in Figure 13. These data are based on attitudes toward Communism expressed by the PW's in their post-repatriation interviews, as well as on statements they made about the enemy's indoctrination program (e.g., its content and techniques). If we assume that some of the PW's may have been "holding back" their true feelings, then these data must be regarded as representing a minimum estimate of the proportion of PW's who accepted Communism to any degree.



Figure 13

From available evidence, it would appear that no more than a small proportion (1%) of the Army PW's were strongly "converted" to Communism. Eighty-eight per cent appear to have accepted nothing, and among those who did, more than half can be described as having only a mild

affinity toward Communism. Among the latter, for example, are those who felt that Communism had helped a backward country like China but was unthinkable in the United States, or that it is a good system in theory but not in practice. For the most part, however, returning PW's expressed the feeling that Communism is unacceptable in that it denies the individual his basic liberties. Typical comments are these: "Communism is a police state," "no room for individual freedom," "no room for personal advancement," "creates slaves to the government," "anti-religious," "a dictatorship," "a corrupt system based on force and violence," and "a system built on lies, fear, distrust, and propaganda." Only in rare cases did PW's express an unreserved acceptance of Communism as, for example, "the highest achievement man could attain" and "a system that would work well in the U.S."

The prevalance of Communist sympathies among the three Groups studied is compared in Figure 13. Virtually all the PW's who exhibited sympathy toward Communism on an ideological level are to be found among the Participators. Among the Resisters and Middle Group only a few prisoners came out of their internment with histories showing sympathy toward Communism, and all of these were, at worst, only mildly favorable. Among the Participators, on the other hand, almost half evidenced some acceptance of Communist ideology. Of these, 42 per cent can be regarded as accepting little, one-third as moderately affected, and one-fourth as accepting much or all of the ideological orientation of their captors.

The data for this research provide some evidence as to how attitudes favorable toward Communism were developed among those PW's who accepted the captor's "line." Only in rare cases was evidence found of Communist sympathies prior to capture. No doubt the captor's indoctrination program itself was responsible for the attitude changes of some PW's. (In some cases, for example, PW's attributed their sympathies to "seeing how the system worked," or to "reading about Communism.") Yet the correlation between the degree of indoctrination received by the PW's and the extent to which they accepted Communism is not so high as we might expect (r = .46), indicating—under the assumption that indoctrination "caused" changes in ideological orientation—that at most only one-fifth of the variance associated with the acceptance of Communism can be accounted for by the degree to which the PW's were subjected to the enemy's teachings.

Among all the rating-scale factors described earlier, the one most highly associated with acceptance of Communism is the degree to which the PW's received preferential treatment (r = .64). In the context of additional findings to be described in subsequent chapters, this would suggest that motives of personal gain were associated, at least as a conditioning factor, in the alteration of attitudes toward Communism. It may very well be, for example, that those PW's for whom preferential treatment was most meaningful learned to associate the captor's ideology with such reward and were thus conditioned to feelings of sympathy toward Communism that indoctrination alone could not effect.

The motives of "converts" (here we are dealing only with Participators) are revealed to some degree by the fact that while half of them

attempted to influence others to accept Communism, these were not in all cases the same PW's who themselves gave evidence of taking the captor's ideology as their own. A third of those who did not accept Communism to any degree are found among the group who attempted, in one way or another to influence the ideological orientation of their fellow PW's. It is reasonable to assume that in attempting to persuade their fellows to take the indoctrination procedures more seriously, to volunteer for study groups, and so forth, as many Participators were seeking to please the captor as were acting out of deep personal conviction.

Unquestionably, some of the Participators came out of internment with sympathies toward Communism as a social system and a political ideology; the data indicate that 45 per cent of this Group had such leanings. What proportion of this number were actual converts is hard to estimate; there can be little doubt, however, that among them were a fair number of PW's whose convictions were only skin deep, who developed pro tem the attitudes which their captor wanted them to hold, and who mouthed the party line simply because it was just another one of the many ways to avoid pressure and live as comfortably as the prison environment would allow.

Of even greater importance, however, is the question of the relationship between acceptance of Communism and the degree of participation with the captor. The correlation between these two factors is only moderately high (r = .55). More important, when we rule out the correlative effects of other cogent factors, we find that the independent relationship between them is low (partial r = .15)—considerably lower than that found between other factors (e.g., susceptibility to inducements and pressure) and participation behavior. These findings, taken together with the fact that 55 per cent of the Participators did not accept Communism to any degree, would indicate that the dynamics of collaborative activity must be explained primarily on other than ideological grounds.

If sympathy toward Communism was not among the most important factors, what then accounts for the behavior of the Participators? The subsequent chapters are devoted, for the most part, to answering this question.

Chapter 7

SUSCEPTIBILITY TO INDUCEMENTS AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT

The single factor found to be most highly related to prisoner-of-war behavior, as indicated earlier, was the degree to which the PW's were susceptible to inducements offered them by the enemy. How prone were the Army PW's to bend to the captor's demands in the face of offers of special treatment and privileges? Figure 14 answers this question separately for the three Groups of PW's studied.



Figure 14

The susceptibility of a given prisoner could not always be readily estimated from the data for this study. While it was relatively easy to gauge the degree of participation on the part of a PW, there was frequently no indication as to how much of this participation was committed in response to inducements by the captor. For this reason ratings on susceptibility were made for less than half of the PW's studied; the percentages reported in Figure 14 are based on a total of only 275 PW's.

For these men for whom data on susceptibility are available, however, the results reveal differences among the three Groups of a magnitude which could hardly have been negated by additional data, were they available. Among the Participators, almost two-thirds can be described as highly susceptible to captor inducements; there were no Resisters and only 5 per cent of the Middle Group in this category. At the other

extreme, 91 per cent of the Resisters and two-thirds of the Middle Group were not susceptible to offers of special treatment, as compared to only 8 per cent of the Participators.

This study contains no data regarding the value judgments by which PW's decided to yield or refuse to yield to their captor in the face of opportunities for enhancing their personal position. By what standards did a Participator who signed petitions and made recordings—or even informed on his fellows—evaluate the importance of these acts as against the importance to himself of the rewards of better food, greater freedom, or a position of power among the enemy? By the same token, what judgments motivated a Resister to refuse to compromise, even in the face of considerable threat and mistreatment? Only through direct and intensive interviewing of the PW's themselves could some general answer to these questions have been found.

From isolated case histories available, it would seem that the dynamics of these decisions varied from prisoner to prisoner. For some, signing a petition was "harmless," mouthing the Communist line "a joke"; others, operating in the environment in which "you could trust nobody," "did others in" before they were "done in" themselves, and thus rationalized their informing activities. Few histories of Resisters indicate that resistance was a matter to be weighed solely in terms of loyalty to country; more often defiance of the enemy was an expression of "hate for the Chink Commies" or of some vague sense of what was right. This much the data show conclusively, however: The behavior of the Participators was opportunistic in nature; the behavior of the Resisters was not.

Opportunistic for what? Were the inducements of the captor real? Did PW's who were attracted by the opportunity to improve their lot through participation actually receive preferential treatment? The data answer this question in the affirmative. One-third of all PW's received some preferential treatment in captivity. Three-fourths of the Participators received such treatment to a great or moderate degree; all but a small percentage of the Middle and Resister Groups received little or nothing, and primarily the latter (see Figure 15).

More important, when the data on susceptibility and preferential treatment are studied together, ample evidence is found for concluding that the two went hand in hand. The correlation between the two factors is .85, indicating an unusually high, positive relationship.[1] For the PW's as a whole, then, the amount of preferential treatment received varied with the degree to which the PW's were susceptible to such inducements. A prisoner who demonstrated his willingness to cooperate in exchange for an improved lot did, in fact, reap tangible rewards. Almost all Participators (94%) who were highly susceptible received a great amount of preferential treatment. Among those few who were not susceptible to inducements, 38 per cent received little or no preferential treatment and only 5 per cent received a great deal.

[1]A full description of the bases for ratings of prisoners on preferential treatment and susceptibility to inducements may be found on p. 52.

EXTENT OF PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT RECEIVED BY THREE PW GROUPS



Figure 15

All this is not to say that the life of a Participator PW was "plush" by any normal standards, but only that it was improved, and considerably, by his yielding to the captor's demands. The Communist captor was not so unrealistic—and perhaps not so ignorant of classic theories of conditioning—as to expect that the PW would become an active and effective collaborator if the rewards which motivated him were not forthcoming. Leniency for Participators was an acknowledged Communist technique, a strategic policy which guided the Chinese captor in his relationships with American PW's.

The frequency with which various types of preferential treatment were received by the three Groups studied is shown in Table 12. Among Participators, who were virtually the only recipients of the captor's rewards, the inducements ranged from specific items such as cigarettes, alcohol, parties, money, and mail to the more general benefits of better PW living such as better food, medical attention, and special living quarters. For those who received preferential treatment and for whom data are available regarding the type received, our results indicate that on the average a Participator received roughly 5 1/2 of the different types of preferential treatment listed in Table 12. The few Middle and Resister PW's in this category averaged two and 1 1/2, respectively, types of preferential treatment per man.

In effect, these differences between Participators and other PW's are so large that one could predict with a high degree of confidence whether a given PW was a Participator simply from a knowledge of whether he was susceptible to inducements, or whether he received a large amount of preferential treatment in captivity. In order to demonstrate further the very close, positive relationship between these factors and prisoner-of-war behavior, it is necessary to study the Participator Group alone, and to answer this question: Did Participators receive preferential treatment in proportion to the degree to which they participated with the enemy? Again the answer provided by the data is yes. Among the Participators shown (Table 12) to have received preferential

Table 12

TYPES OF PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT RECEIVED BY THREE PW GROUPS

(per cent)[a]

Type of Treatment	Participators (N = 238)	Middle (N = 203)	Resisters (N = 138)
Cigarettes, candy, alcohol	58	3	3
Better food	52	2	2
Better medical treatment	52	1	0
Parties	35	0	0
Increased personal freedom	34	1	1
Less work and easier jobs	33	(b)	1
Special living quarters	30	1	1
Extra clothing	27	1	0
Money	26	1	0
Presents and personal favors	9	1	0
Sleeping late	6	0	0
Less punishment for infractions	3	0	0
More mail	2	0	0
Other	15	(b)	1
Total "None" and "No Information" (number of men)	(76)	(193)	(129)
Average Number of Types of Preferential Treatment Received	5.6	2.0	1.4

[a] Percentages total more than 100 per cent due to multiple responses.
[b] Less than 0.5%.

treatment, those who were later designated as court-martial cases (considered here as the most extreme Participators) received more preferential treatment than other Participators. For example, 67 per cent of the court-martial Participators were given increased personal freedom in internment, while only 30 per cent of the remaining Participators received such treatment; 80 per cent of the court-martial cases received better food, in contrast to 50 per cent of the remaining Participators. No matter what type of preferential treatment was to be had, the extreme Participators received the greatest share. On the average, court-martialed Participators received six of the different types of preferential treatments listed; the average for the remaining Participators was three per man.

As another illustration of the close relationship between participation and preferential treatment, the rewards of those Participators who informed on their fellows and of those who did not may be contrasted. The act of informing was undoubtedly regarded by the captor as one of the most potent aids in prisoner manipulation and control, and the rewards for informers might be expected to be especially great. This hypothesis is substantiated by the data, as is shown in Table 13. Two-thirds of the informers received a great amount of preferential treatment, as compared to only 16 per cent of the non-informers. For every informer who received little or no preferential treatment, there were more than three non-informers.

In summary, these data clearly indicate a high positive relationship between susceptibility to captor rewards and their receipt on the one hand, and degree of participation with the enemy on the other. These data do not tell us, however, whether the factors of better treatment and participation were causally related, and if so, in what fashion.

Table 13

PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT AMONG PARTICIPATOR INFORMERS AND NON-INFORMERS

(per cent)

Degree of Preferential Treatment	Informers (N = 126)	Non-Informers (N = 101)
Great	64	16
Moderate	23	40
Little or none	13	44

Additional data collected for this study, while they do not altogether solve the cause-and-effect relationship, do throw some light on this important question: Did a PW participate because he received preferential treatment, or did he receive preferential treatment because he participated? In other words, did the captor pre-select a group of PW's for preferential treatment in the hope that through such softening up they would become cooperative? Or did the promise of preferential treatment precede participation, as an incentive which was later realized as a reward?

The data tend to support the second view. Among the reasons given by PW's for their receipt of preferential treatment, one stands out with the greatest frequency: collaborative cooperation with the enemy. Sixty-three per cent of the Participators can be considered to have received preferential treatment because of their collaboration with the captor; 12 per cent were better treated as a result of their "compliance with enemy demands" outside the realm of collaborative activity (i.e., demands made as part of camp routine); 11 per cent received preferential treatment in connection with their jobs in camp. Only infrequently were other reasons found (e.g., because of physical disability, or as a result of homosexual liaisons).

Many case histories can be cited to illustrate the fact that Participator PW's viewed the possibility of preferential treatment as an incentive, and actually realized their rewards later, after participating. To be sure, once a PW lived the role of a Participator for a considerable period, collaborative activity and preferential treatment became a circular affair, one following upon the other. In addition, overt offers of preferential treatment as an incentive were not always necessary, for a PW could easily perceive that some of his fellows were enjoying the rewards of participation. Nevertheless, the reports of returning PW's support the conclusion that the captor offered the opportunity for preferred treatment as an inducement, and "delivered the goods" primarily

only after a PW had demonstrated his willingness to cooperate. The following excerpts from the dossier reports are typical:[1]

"... received cigarettes, medical care and food because he cooperated with the Chinese";

"... received preferential treatment for informing";

"... received preferential treatment as a result of collaboration";

"... For his cooperation with the Chinese he received better food and medical treatment, money, cigarettes, better living conditions and special privileges."

As noted earlier, the data provide no direct indications of the judgments made by Participators as they decided to cooperate with the captor and accept his rewards. In a subsequent chapter, however, findings will be presented concerning the nature of the relationships among the prisoners and their attitudes toward one another. If nothing else, these data provide insights into the emotional environment in which the opportunist operated, an environment which made altogether logical the following statement made by a Participator in camp: "If anyone is going to live, I am, and I don't give a damn what happens to anyone else. I'd do anything for food."

Perhaps the best way to summarize the findings of this chapter and the training problems they raise is to quote from the remarks made upon repatriation by a high-ranking PW who was senior officer in one of the compounds: "It was hard to keep morale up when certain individuals were getting preferential treatment for doing work for the CCF. Many men could not see anything wrong with this morally if, by doing this, they had a better chance to survive. By doing so, an individual became entangled so deeply that he could never emerge from the clutches of the Communists. To many men it was a hard decision to make not to become opportunists and collaborators. It was tragic to see that some would not resist the temptation."

Some did; their "rewards" are the subject of the next chapter.

[1]Emphasis supplied.

Chapter 8

PRESSURE

A reading of the histories of Army PW's in Korea leaves little doubt that this experience—like most prisoner-of-war episodes in history—was marked by its share of stress. Although conditions of the Korean compounds improved considerably after the summer of 1951, when the Chinese became the major captor power, and although over-all conditions varied from camp to camp, the general situation was one of deprivation, neglect, and the repressive regimentation which PW life entails.

The purpose of this chapter is only secondarily to describe the stresses of internment and the pressures experienced by our PW's in Korea. The primary objective in the context of this study is to determine what relationship exists between the pressures endured by our PW's and their behavior at the hands of the Communists.

STRESS IN EVACUATION

One hypothesis about PW behavior developed in this research had to do with the initial stress experienced by Army troops upon capture. A reading of a few PW dossiers, including accounts of the traumatic death marches under the North Koreans, left the impression that the first experiences of the PW's may have shaped their subsequent behavior; it was therefore hypothesized that those PW's who experienced the greatest stress in their evacuation from the front lines tended, more frequently than others, to become Participators. The assumption here was that these men were "softened up" by the initial trauma of PW life and therefore were more ready to accede to the demands of the enemy for collaborative activity once they reached a permanent camp.

This hypothesis was not substantiated. Table 14 presents the percentages of PW's in the three Groups studied who experienced varying degrees of hardship and stress during the evacuation period. No reliable differences appear among them. In all three Groups only a small proportion can be considered to have experienced a highly stressful evacuation period. There were also relatively few cases of PW's who experienced no stress at all during this early period of imprisonment. For most PW's in all three Groups the evacuation period was moderately or mildly stressful. It must be remembered, however, that these data do not include the experiences of the hundreds of PW's who died in evacuation, especially during the horrible "death marches" early in the conflict; the stresses to which these PW's were subjected were great indeed.

Table 14

EXTENT OF HARDSHIP AND STRESS IN EVACUATION PERIOD AMONG THREE PW GROUPS

(per cent)

Extent of Hardship and Stress	Participators (N = 238)	Middle (N = 203)	Resisters (N = 138)
Great	12	15	17
Moderate	38	41	45
Mild	36	35	31
None	14	9	7
No information (number of men)	(30)	(7)	(6)

Our data indicate that the stresses that accompanied evacuation were only rarely a reflection of willful mistreatment on the part of the captor. The rigors of this period were defined primarily by the elements, the lack of food and clothing, and the wounded and weakened condition of the men in their march to the rear, and not by pressures applied directly by the captor. Less than 10 per cent of all PW's were directly mistreated by the captor during the evacuation period.

It is significant also that the captor made few organized attempts to induce collaboration among the PW's at this first stage of their imprisonment. Such attempts began soon after a PW arrived in his first permanent camp, and it is not surprising that it was here that pressures became more direct and meaningful. Before going forward in the chronology of the prisoners' experiences, however, the findings to this point may be summarized as follows: The participation-resistance behavior evidenced by the Army PW's in Korea was unrelated to the degree of hardship, stress, and mistreatment they experienced in the initial, evacuation phase of their captivity.

CONTRAST IN TREATMENT IN EVACUATION AND FIRST PERMANENT CAMP

How did the treatment received in the evacuation period compare to that which the PW's experienced in their first permanent camp? For the Participators the treatment received in first permanent camp was markedly better than in evacuation; only 13 per cent of this Group experienced worse treatment in their first camp (see Figure 16). Almost half of the Resisters, on the other hand, received treatment in their first camp which compared unfavorably with earlier evacuation experiences. The Middle Group falls between the two, although much more like the Participators than the Resisters.

In effect, then, PW's categorized as Participators, Middle Men, and Resisters began their lives under the Communists with pressures no different in kind or intensity. For two Groups, the first permanent camp provided a relative relief from stress; for the Resisters,

COMPARISON OF TREATMENT RECEIVED BY THREE PW GROUPS IN EVACUATION AND FIRST PERMANENT CAMP



Figure 16

permanent camp offered no such widespread relief. Were no further data available, two alternative interpretations of this finding could be advanced with equal confidence: On the one hand, one might suspect that the captor set about treating some prisoners in camp worse than others in the hope of making participators out of them; on the other hand, some prisoners may have revealed themselves predominantly as resisters and their treatment may have worsened as a result. All of the relevant data for this study tend to support the second view.

OVER-ALL PRESSURE

Among the rating scales was one utilized to evaluate the over-all pressure (including threat and actual abuse) endured by each PW during his entire internment experience. In view of the findings just described, any differences descriptive of over-all internment pressure must be accounted for by experiences after evacuation, that is, between arrival at first permanent camp and liberation—the period in which the captor conducted his well-organized attempts to induce collaboration.

The degrees of pressure, both threats and actual mistreatment, endured by the three PW Groups in captivity are shown in Figure 17. Here, as in virtually all estimates of pressure provided by this study, the Resister Group was found to differ markedly from the other two Groups. Only a very small proportion of the Participators and Middle Group endured severe threats and abuses at the hands of the captor; in contrast, extreme pressures were the lot of over a third of the Resisters. More than two-thirds of the non-Resisters (in the case of the Participators, 77%) experienced little or no pressure; no more than a fourth of the Resisters can be placed in this category. As a matter of fact, if we separate the "Little" and "None" categories, we find over a third of the Participators and a fourth of the Middle Group with no pressures endured. Among the Resisters only a handful (4%) went through their experiences as PW's free of all pressures.



Figure 17

These data contradict one of the hypotheses tested in this study, an hypothesis based on the popular assumption that Participators were the recipients of the largest proportion of the captor's pressures. In the minds of many, the Participator was typically the product of extreme threats and mistreatment applied in internment. The PSYFREE results, however, contradict this notion. Participation behavior correlates positively not with pressure, but with freedom from pressure. This is not to deny, of course, that one can find isolated cases of PW's categorized as Participators who endured extreme pressures in internment. By and large, however, it was the Resister who uniquely bore the burden of the captor's threats and abuse.

PRESSURES IN INTERROGATION AND INDOCTRINATION

Independent estimates were made in this study of the pressures to which PW's were subjected as part of the captor's interrogation and indoctrination procedures. Four questions were explored: How much threat did the captor exert in demanding participation in the captor program of interrogation? How much actual mistreatment and abuse? How much threat did the captor exert in demanding participation in the captor program of indoctrination? And, again, how much actual mistreatment and abuse?

Data bearing on these questions are discussed fully in the chapter dealing specifically with interrogation and indoctrination. It is relevant here to point out again that as part of both the interrogation and indoctrination activities of the captor, the Resisters endured a greater degree of both threat and abuse than did Participator and Middle Group PW's. The differences here, while statistically highly significant, are not quite so large as those relating to over-all pressure (Figure 17). The latter may be regarded as an aggregate of the threats and abuse experienced over the entire incarceration, of which those in interrogation and indoctrination form a part.

MISTREATMENT

Many of the pressures experienced by the PW's in internment were interpreted by them as outright mistreatment, and with good reason. No judgments as to what pressures constituted mistreatment were made by the researchers; for purposes of this study all incidents reported by the PW's as mistreatment were automatically included under this heading. A comparison of the three PW Groups in terms of the number of separate instances of mistreatment they experienced in permanent camps is presented in Table 15. Resisters were found to have experienced considerably more than other PW's. Similar results are revealed in comparing the number of incidents in the prisoners' experience which they considered war crimes or atrocities. These were endured by 13 per cent of the Resisters, 6 per cent of the Middle Men, and 5 per cent of the Participators.

Table 15

INSTANCES OF MISTREATMENT EXPERIENCED IN PERMANENT CAMPS BY THREE PW GROUPS

(per cent)

Instances of Mistreatment	Participators (N = 238)	Middle (N = 203)	Resisters (N = 138)
None	78	77	45
One	14	14	33
Two or more	8	9	22
No information (number of men)	(24)	(20)	(19)

The fact that PW's classified as Resisters were mistreated more than Participator and Middle PW's does not, of itself, tell us why, or in what context mistreatment was received. Table 16 helps answer this question. It is apparent that mistreatment most frequently resulted

Table 16

MISTREATMENT AMONG THREE PW GROUPS

(per cent)

Type of Mistreatment	Participators (N = 238)	Middle (N = 203)	Resisters (N = 138)
Mistreatment for resistance [a]			
Incarceration	7	10	37
Physical abuse	7	5	27
Hard labor	2	4	18
Deprivation	2	4	11
Bound or shackled	2	2	11
Exposure to elements	2	4	7
None	88	86	49
No information (number of men)	(24)	(18)	(7)

(Continued)

Table 16 *(Continued)*

MISTREATMENT AMONG THREE PW GROUPS

(per cent)

Type of Mistreatment	Participators (N = 238)	Middle (N = 203)	Resisters (N = 138)
Mistreatment for asocial behavior[a]			
Incarceration	4	2	9
Physical abuse	2	2	5
Hard labor	1	1	3
Deprivation	1	1	4
Bound or shackled	(b)	0	4
Exposure to elements	2	2	5
None	93	94	86
No information (number of men)	(25)	(22)	(9)
Sadistic mistreatment			
Yes	1	0	5
No	99	100	95
No information (number of men)	(25)	(23)	(10)

[a]Percentages total more than 100 per cent due to multiple responses.
[b]Less than 0.5%.

specifically from resistance activities. This applies to all Groups, but most dramatically to the Resisters. Half of the Resisters were mistreated as a result of their resistance; in contrast, only 14 per cent received mistreatment as punishment for asocial behavior (e.g., striking guards, infractions of camp rules) and only 5 per cent for "no reason" (i.e., apparently—as interpreted by some PW's—out of pure sadism on the part of the captor). Comparison of the three Groups shows significantly more mistreatment among Resisters than among other PW's for both resistance and asocial behavior; however, the larger difference by far is again with respect to mistreatment for resistance activities.

A reading of individual cases of mistreatment reveals numerous instances of apparently severe abuse on the part of the captor. A typical case concerns an officer who, when asked during an indoctrination session for his opinion of a Communist article, responded by saying that it wasn't worth the paper it was written on. As one PW related the incident: "For this he was taken out and made to stand at attention by one of the Chinese guards. He stood at attention for approximately five hours and . . . finally fainted. The Chinese guards immediately tried to arouse him by prodding him with bayonets and struck him with a rifle butt. Later he was dragged away by his feet and his head bounced on the rocky path. He was put in solitary confinement and forced to read a confession and self-criticism. . . ." Experiences like this one give meaning to such labels as "Physical Abuse" and "Incarceration," and these meanings are in many instances stark and horrifying.

It is important, however, to put prisoner mistreatment in its proper perspective as far as the experiences of all returning PW's are concerned. To do this the following finding should be kept in

mind: Three-fourths of all returning PW's received no mistreatment in Korea, and 94 per cent experienced no incidents considered by them to be war crimes or atrocities.

These statistics do not minimize the problem posed by an enemy who has demonstrated his capability and willingness to use the most extreme pressures on prisoners. The legal and moral implications of such behavior are, of course, not a focus of this study, which is concerned primarily with the behavioral correlates of the pressures of internment. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted, therefore, to an exposition and analysis of data which—indirectly, at least—test the hypothesis that Participators participated so as to avoid pressure and Resisters resisted in spite of considerable pressure to participate.

PARTICIPATION AS THE AVOIDANCE OF PRESSURE

It is fair to assume that capture and imprisonment at the hands of the enemy constituted a threatening situation to most PW's in Korea. Even after the rigors of combat, being taken prisoner by the Chinese—and certainly by the North Koreans—did not of itself encourage feelings of security; this was the first incarceration for all but a small handful of the PW's, and fear of the unknown must certainly have been present. We do know from basic psychological research, however, that there are wide differences in the perceptions by different individuals of the same stimuli, certainly of emotionally toned stimuli. Unfortunately, on this important problem no data were available by which to gauge the manners in which PW's perceived captivity, what their expectations were, or to what degree imprisonment was a threat.

Our data do include, however, an estimate of the degree to which the PW's were susceptible to threats made directly by the captor. Before the findings on this score are described, it should be made clear that the impact of direct threat carried with it at least the suspicion—and in very many cases the direct knowledge—that the captor was capable of putting his threats into effect. A PW did not have to experience abuse at the hands of his captor to be aware that the threat of being abused was present as long as he was a PW. It is true enough, as noted earlier, that only 6 per cent of the returning PW's physically experienced atrocities; but four times as many saw them committed, and as many more heard about them. Considering the Participators alone, only 22 per cent experienced mistreatment, for any reason; but again, many more (62%) heard about others being mistreated. Implied threat was a definite technique of coercion used by the captor; the frequent presence of a pistol on the table separating the PW from the interrogator carried its own message.

In this context, then, let us restate the question studied by one of the rating scales: How prone were the PW's to conform to the captor's demands in the face of specific, overtly stated threats? The results for the three prisoner Groups are presented in Table 17. Clearly the Participators were much more susceptible to threat than the Resisters; the Middle Group falls between the two, though closer to the Resisters.

Table 17

SUSCEPTIBILITY TO THREAT AMONG THREE PW GROUPS

(per cent)

Susceptibility	Participators (N = 238)	Middle (N = 203)	Resisters (N = 138)
Highly susceptible	48	10	0
Moderately susceptible	45	51	29
Not susceptible	7	39	71
No information (number of men)	(91)	(68)	(16)

The question that immediately presents itself, then, is whether those PW's who were more susceptible to threat received significantly less pressure in captivity.[1] This relationship was studied separately for the three prisoner Groups. The results found for Participators are reported in Table 18. Among those Participators who were highly susceptible to threat, over three-fourths received little or no pressure in internment; the less susceptible Participators received significantly greater pressure. A similar trend is apparent for the other PW Groups, and parallel findings result when susceptibility is related to inducements in the same fashion that it is to pressures received.

Table 18

SUSCEPTIBILITY AND INFORMING, AS COMPARED TO PRESSURE, AMONG PARTICIPATORS

(per cent)

Pressure	Susceptibility to Threat		Informers	
	Highly Susceptible	Moderately Susceptible	Yes	No
Moderate or extreme	21	43	19	26
Little or none	79	57	81	74
Number of PW's	(69)	(76)	(121)	(104)

The conclusion is, therefore, that those PW's who conformed to the captor's demands when faced with threats of mistreatment and/or offers of preferential treatment avoided pressure in internment more successfully than those who did not conform. More important, there is every indication from the data that it was this very avoidance of pain on the one hand and the seeking of positive rewards on the other that, more than any other factor, accounts for the behavior of the Participators. This conclusion is supported by the findings that follow, some of which have already been reported in previous chapters.

(1) The possibility that Participators cooperated with the enemy because they were pressured more than others during internment is

[1]See footnote 1, page 53.

ruled out by the finding that over three-fourths of the Participators received little or no pressure during this period, and that fully one-third received none at all. The Participator Group is marked not by the receipt of pressure, but by the relative freedom from pressure.

With respect to no single act of participation can we find evidence of greater pressure on those who committed the act than on those who did not. Informing serves as a good example. The hypothesis that informers were pressured into this act cannot be substantiated (see Table 18).

(2) The Participators were unique in that they—significantly more than all other PW's—were susceptible to inducements offered by the enemy and did, in fact, receive virtually all of the preferential treatment offered by the captor. The correlation between degree of participation and degree of susceptibility to inducements is a remarkably high, positive one.

(3) The Participators were significantly more prone to bend to the captor's will when faced with threat of mistreatment than were other PW's; and, the more susceptible they were, the less pressure they received.

Considering again a specific act of participation, we find a greater susceptibility to threat among those Participators who informed than among those who did not. Two-thirds of the informers were highly susceptible to threat, as compared to only 30 per cent of the non-informers. Greater susceptibility to inducements and threat, the receipt of preferential treatment—these, and not greater pressure. are found among men who informed on their fellow prisoners in Korea.

(4) Finally, for most of the Participators, faced with the same initial stresses as their fellows, first permanent camp represented a considerable improvement over the evacuation period. Although this study does not provide a picture of the temporal sequence in which participation behavior took place, we may infer from this finding that the choice to cooperate with the enemy was made, by and large, early in internment.

These are the data, then, which lead strongly to the conclusion that in general Participators cooperated with the captor to avoid the pressure and outright mistreatment which would have been their lot had they chosen to resist. The avoidance of pressure and relief from fear were apparently made all the more meaningful by rewards offered to those who did the captor's bidding. For those PW's susceptible to such inducements and also moved by threats to their well-being, the bargain was worth making. These are the terms in which the Participators can be best described.

PRESSURE AS THE PRICE FOR RESISTANCE

We have already seen that pressure and outright mistreatment were typically the lot of the Resister PW. The data of Table 16 and many specific case histories like the one cited earlier in this chapter indicate that these experiences were, more than anything else, the consequence

of resistance. There is no evidence that the Chinese arbitrarily selected some PW's as objects of pressure in order to intimidate the prisoners at large. Intimidation was, of course, a natural by-product, but it flowed from concrete punishments for concrete acts of resistance. The following instance, corroborated by numerous PW's, serves as a good example.

Two prisoners escaped from Camp No. 5 in the spring of 1951. As one PW told it: "About three or four days later they were returned under Chinese Guard and when they passed our compound we could see they were tied up. The ropes were tied on their arms just above their elbows and ran across their backs and forming a sort of triangle with one point going around their necks. They were put in a hole in the ground that was a crude air raid shelter. This hole was immediately adjacent to our Mess Area, and each morning at breakfast and again at supper time we would see the guards let them out of the hole for their food. Their arms were never untied on these occasions and they were forced to strain into irregular and torturous positions to enable them to eat their food. They were kept in this manner for a period of at least 10 days and nights, being removed from the hole during the day and being returned to the hole at night. They were never given blankets or bedding to my knowledge. They were forced to write confessions and self-criticism of their actions and on the day they were forced to read these writings in the th ater, all officers in our compound and hundreds of Enlisted Men were marched to the theater for this. As a result of this, one PW lost the use of his hands for several months."

For the Chinese Communists, punishment for resistance is as natural as reward for collaboration. Refusal of PW's to accept the leniency policy of the captor and live within the rules of the regime would, by the standards of the captor, logically set these men apart as objects of contempt and reprisal. As a matter of fact, the captor utilized the Korean camps to a large degree to segregate the cooperative from the uncooperative PW's.

When we relate pressures received to specific acts committed we find consistent trends showing that pressure was greater for those who did not commit acts of participation. These data can best be summarized by comparing the pressures among Resisters who contributed in different degrees to the propaganda functions of the enemy. The results are clear. Those few Resisters (14) who contributed fairly extensively to the enemy's psywar effort received significantly less pressure than those who did not (121). About half of those who contributed to enemy propaganda were subjected to substantial pressure, as compared to four-fifths of those who took little or no part in enemy propaganda.

What about actual, positive acts of resistance? Because of the small numbers involved, the reliability of the relationship between specific acts of resistance and pressure within each PW Group is difficult to establish. This relationship can best be illustrated by comparing the amount of pressure exerted on all PW's who did and did not make anti-Communist speeches during their internment. Those who made speeches against the captor (93) were subjected to significantly more pressure than those who did not (29). Three-fourths of those making

speeches but less than half of those who did not make speeches were subjected to substantial pressure. In the absence of other data, the correlation between resistance and pressure described here could be interpreted as showing that those who were the butt of enemy pressures turned against the captor and refused to cooperate. There are no indications that this was the sequence—that is that some PW's were indiscriminately selected by the captor for pressure either as tools for intimidation or as an "experiment." On the contrary, all of the relevant data indicate that some PW's—the Resisters—chose not to cooperate with the captor and resisted in spite of considerable pressures. These PW's, too, made their own bargain and evidently felt it was worth making.

Chapter 9

INTERRELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE PRISONERS

CONCERN FOR FELLOW PW'S

It is a fairly common phenomenon to find individuals who differ among themselves in many ways sharing a feeling of "togetherness" when faced with a common threat. One might expect that such feelings of mutual concern and group identity would have been encouraged to a great extent by the experience of incarceration shared among Army troops in Korea. Such was not the case. The proportions of prisoners who evidenced varying degrees of concern and compassion toward their fellow PW's in internment are shown in Figure 18. The bases for these data are primarily specific acts performed by the PW's in captivity—for example, sharing food, stealing food for sick PW's, caring for the sick, protecting others from the captor, or, on the other hand, stealing food from others, ignoring or abusing the sick, or informing. Only a relatively small percentage of the PW's showed strong concern for others, while over a third can be described as caring little or not at all about the welfare of their fellow prisoners.

This finding is made more realistic by the accounts of medical officers of the frequent instances of outright abuse of PW's by their fellows, instances even of "men dying because of the fault of their buddies," when, for example, sick prisoners "would be thrown out into the freezing cold because they [other PW's] would not take care of them. This extended to simple things like a request for water. When asked or told to bring water they would just ignore the request." Another report concerns the black marketing which was rampant in two camps. In these camps "men would appropriate the company's food ration and sell it to individuals. The valuables of the dead and dying men would be stolen and traded to the Koreans for tobacco. Cigarettes rolled with this tobacco would then sell for anywhere from $5 to $20 each. Clothing (often stolen) would sell at outrageous prices. A few more procured medicine from unknown sources . . . and sold it to men dying for need of it at absurd prices. One could not track down these culprits, for the victim who had to pay the price would not reveal the source, for if he did, he knew the source would be eliminated."

Considerable differences are revealed in this connection when the Participator, Middle, and Resister Groups are contrasted; these results are also shown in Figure 18. Almost two-thirds of the Participators showed little or no concern for their fellow prisoners, as compared to only 9 per cent of the Resisters. At the other extreme, a third of the

CONCERN AND COMPASSION FOR FELLOWS



Figure 18

Resisters evidenced strong concern, as against only a very small proportion (7%) of the Participators. The Middle Group falls between the two, although the Resisters are clearly unique in having a significantly larger proportion of PW's who were judged to show strong compassion for their fellows than did either of the other two Groups.

This finding should not be interpreted as revealing the Resister to be altogether the self-sacrificing, long suffering, compassionate individual whose behavior transcends passion and self-interest. There is good reason to believe that the concern for others which the Resisters showed was limited—at a maximum—to others minus those prisoners who were suspected of being "Progressives," or collaborators with the enemy. Although based on considerably less than half of the total sample, the data of Table 19 indicate that the Resisters felt very little other than contempt and hatred for the Participators, and behaved toward them primarily in a hostile fashion. We saw earlier, too, that being anti-Progressive was largely defined by Resisters as "beating up Pros"; the mission of certain of the Resister organizations in Korea was, in fact, simply to physically abuse the Participators. Twenty-two per cent of the returning PW's report being aware of the outright mistreatment of prisoners by their fellows—including beatings resulting in death—

Table 19

ATTITUDES CONCERNING PARTICIPATORS AMONG THREE PW GROUPS

(per cent)

	Participators (N = 238)	Middle (N = 203)	Resisters (N = 138)
Attitude toward Participators[a]			
Sympathetic	15	2	2
Suspicious	4	4	4
Fearful	2	0	0
Contempt and hate	59	91	93
Indifference	9	9	9
Other	13	0	9
No information (number of men)	(192)	(147)	(84)
Relationship with Participators			
Friendly	62	3	0
Isolated	21	53	9
Overtly anti-social and hostile	14	39	88
Other	3	5	3
No information (number of men)	(209)	(167)	(95)

[a]Percentages total more than 100% due to multiple responses.

and there is little doubt that some were victims of the hostility felt by the Resisters.

The data of this study reveal nothing about the ways in which Resisters related to Middle PW's, that is, those who were not blatantly cooperative with the enemy. Considering the fact that the Resisters suffered the heaviest deprivation and mistreatment by the captor, we may suspect that, at a minimum, the concern and compassion they showed was a "closed shop" affair, directed primarily toward those among themselves who were really most in need of help. In any case, there is evidence that the resentment and bitterness felt toward Participators were not transient feelings, but rather deep-seated ones which carried over beyond internment. Two-thirds of the Resisters expressed marked hostility toward Participators in their post-repatriation interviews; some of these were men who continued to nurture the vow taken in Korea that they would "get" a certain Participator or group of them in civilian life. One attempt to throw a hated Participator overboard during the voyage home was aborted only through the arguments of a less emotionally involved Resister.

In view of the internment behavior of Participators, and especially the fact that suspicion of informers among them was always present, the contempt and hatred shown toward this Group is not surprising. In the opinion of many returning PW's, the captor recognized the suspicion of informing as the most potent divisive technique he could muster. It is difficult to imagine a Resister, himself the object of intense pressure, who, seeing his Participator fellows living relatively well, would not be moved to bitterness and hatred. It would be a rare individual indeed who, in these circumstances, would feel impelled to attempt to dissuade

Participators—in rational terms—from cooperating with the enemy, or to "convert" them to resistance. Among the prisoners as a whole, half never encouraged another PW to resist, and only 10 per cent gave a great deal of encouragement. As might be expected, the encouragement of resistance was virtually non-existent among the Participators; and among the Middle Group, 45 per cent never encouraged others, 17 per cent seldom, and only 9 per cent to a great degree. All but a few of the Resisters encouraged others to some extent (50% a great deal), but, again, this was very likely intra-Resister behavior which, at most, was extended only to those middle-of-the-road PW's with whom the Resisters could feel some degree of identity.

What can be said about the relationship of Participators and Middle Men toward their fellows?

We must suspect the validity of the information available regarding the ways in which Participators related to each other, for it would be a natural defensive reaction for them to attempt to disassociate themselves from other Participators in their post-repatriation interviews. Nevertheless, from the data of Table 19 we may infer that at least some Participators felt contempt and suspicion of others in their own Group, and that some isolated themselves from their co-Participators. That the Participators showed little concern for the PW's at large is apparent, and, in the milieu of Participators, there was little need or opportunity for mutual concern even among themselves.

Data regarding the Middle Men will be discussed in detail in the chapter devoted exclusively to this Group. For the moment it should be pointed out that, if it can be assumed that their described feelings are valid, they evidently shared much the same feelings of contempt and hatred for the Participators that were evidenced by the Resisters; apparently, however, they were reluctant to act on these feelings and take overt action against Progressives. Isolation best describes the response of this Group.

In summary, there is little evidence of any widespread cohesiveness or esprit de corps among the Army PW's in Korea. The captor, in encouraging informers and in physically separating Resisters from other PW's, implemented divisiveness in the prison camps. The PW's themselves demonstrated little mutual concern or encouragement, certainly little that crossed the tightly drawn lines between those who resisted and those who cooperated with the captor. The Middle Group, middle-of-the-roaders as far as their behavior toward the captor was concerned, apparently succeeded in maintaining a similar course in their behavior toward other prisoners. As will be indicated in detail later, these men were marked above all by withdrawal and isolation from the world of the Korean compounds.

ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

Information regarding organizational activities in internment was not available in the PW dossiers with sufficient regularity to permit estimates of the proportions of PW's who were affiliated with specific

groups. We do know that various prisoner organizations existed in the Korean compounds, some of them initiated by the captor and others by the prisoners themselves. Sixteen per cent of all PW's were affiliated with at least one organization. Among these were purely service groups (e.g., entertainment "committees," athletic organizations, sanitation "committees"), in which membership may have been composed of PW's from any or all of the three criterion Groups. Of sole interest here are those organizations whose mission it was either to resist the captor or to implement collaboration with him. In an attempt to test certain hypotheses regarding the function and importance of these organizations, only the following cases were utilized: Resisters known to be members of one or more specific Resister organizations, and those known never to have been a member of an organization of any type; a similar distinction was made among Participators. Unfortunately, the number of cases analyzed in this fashion was small, partly because relatively few PW's joined Resister and Participator organizations, and also because pertinent data were not uniformly available.

Resister Organizations

The avowed mission of most of the Resister organizations in Korea was to implement resistance toward the captor and to discourage collaboration. The means by which these aims were pursued varied from group to group and included organizing plans to "break up" indoctrination sessions, aiding in escape activities, making speeches and other counterindoctrination efforts, destroying captor property, and threatening and beating known or suspected "Progressives." The names given Resister organizations were often descriptive of the ways in which they functioned. Among the active groups were the "Klu Klux Klan," "Cannibals Club," "The Kangaroo Court," "The War Council," "The Circle" (so named because the members once encircled and beat a Participator), "The Non-Benedict Arnold Club," "The Federated Hearts of America," and "The Golden Cross." Many of the Resister organizations, described in general by the PW's as "Reactionary," operated on a terroristic note, with vengeance against informers a strong motivating force. "Keeping 'Pros' in line" was often the manifest mission of the Resister Groups.

From the data available for this study, an attempt was made to test the hypothesis that Resisters affiliated with organizations resisted more, and at less cost to themselves (in terms of captor reprisals), than did Resisters who were not members. The analyses of relevant data follow.

Extent of Participation. There is evidence that Resister organization members participated to a significantly lesser degree than non-members (see Table 20).

Resistance Activities. The data suggest also that a higher proportion of Resister organizational members resisted the captor in positive ways than did non-members. As an example (indicated in Table 20), the proportion of Resister members who made anti-Communist speeches is almost twice as large as among non-members.

Encouragement of others to resist was significantly greater among members (Table 20). In the severely repressive environment of the

Table 20

COMPARISON OF RESISTER ORGANIZATION MEMBERS AND NON-MEMBERS

(per cent)

	Members	Non-Members
Participation		
Little	95	76
Moderate or great	5	24
Number of PW's	(20)	(74)
Anti-Communist speeches		
Yes	65	3o
No	35	64
Number of PW's	(20)	(76)
Degree of encouragement given		
Great	65	38
Moderate or none	35	62
Number of PW's	(20)	(72)
Mistreatment endured		
Yes	68	48
No	32	52
Number of PW's	(19)	(65)
Pressure received		
Moderate or much	85	71
Little	15	29
Number of PW's	(20)	(76)

Korean compounds the importance of such encouragement cannot be overestimated.

Not surprising, in view of the fact that the physical abuse of Participators was an avowed mission of a number of "Reactionary" groups, is the finding that Resister members "beat up" suspected "Progressives" more frequently than did non-members. The percentages of Resisters who took such action are 20 per cent for members and 4 per cent for non-members.

Pressure. The hypothesis that Resister members "got by" with less pressure in internment is not substantiated by the findings on this point (Table 20). In the eyes of returning PW's, members were perceived as "resistance leaders" over twice as often as non-members, and there is considerable testimony that the captor, too, perceived Resister organizations and their members as potentially the most threatening force he faced, and dealt with them accordingly. The effectiveness of organized resistance was further thwarted by the tight separation of officers from enlisted men in the Korean compounds; only one officer can be found among the Resister organization members studied here. Ninety-five per cent of the Resisters had only some high school education. Nevertheless, although effective leadership was absent, the results indicate that within the framework of positive resistance as it existed among the PW's Resisters affiliated with organizations accomplished more than those who were not.

Participator Organizations

Some of the Participators were active in camp organizations whose primary mission was to implement the indoctrination efforts of the enemy. For the most part these organizations were captor sponsored, and their names indicate the purposes they were intended to serve; they were called, for example, "Peace Committees," "Peace Fighters." No significant differences between members of these organizations and nonmembers can be found, either in terms of the degree to which they cooperated with the captor or the degree to which they were favorably treated. No doubt the act of joining one of these groups sometimes implied a personal acceptance of the captor's ideology. More often, however, it would appear that this was simply another of the ways in which the Participators demonstrated their willingness to do the captor's bidding.

Chapter 10

MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Data descriptive of the physical characteristics of Army PW's available for this study included only routine assessments of physical condition made when men entered the Army, similar assessments plus routine medical findings made upon repatriation, and descriptions of the medical care given PW's during their internment. No thorough psychological evaluations of the PW's were made, either through intensive interviews or personality tests; routine psychiatric examinations of the PW's conducted upon repatriation provided only over-all diagnoses of their "mental health" and descriptions of psychiatric symptoms found.

MEDICAL

Pre-Internment

Two items of information derived from Army personnel records describe the physical condition of the PW's at the time they entered military service. These are the standard, fourfold "physical category" classification (A - B - C - E) which identifies the degree of disability revealed through medical and psychiatric examinations, and, secondly the designation of whether or not the soldier should be given "limited assignment" for reasons of health. Ninety-three per cent of all PW's were in Physical Category A, 6 per cent in B, and one per cent in C. Ninety-five per cent were regarded as having no assignment limitations. In neither case are differences found among PW's in the Participator, Middle, and Resister Groups. From available data, then, there is no evidence of differences among the three prisoner Groups in physical well-being prior to internment.

An interesting finding is derived from comparison of the three Groups in terms of their body build prior to capture (Table 21). The Resister Group was found to be unique in having a higher proportion of heavy men and a lower proportion of slender men than are found among the remaining PW's. The proportion of slender men is twice as large among Participators as among Resisters. Admittedly these data are based on rough approximations of body build and the categories are not clearly definable. Nevertheless, the finding might raise a number of

Table 21

BODY BUILD AMONG THREE PW GROUPS AT CAPTURE

(per cent)

Build	Participator (N = 238)	Middle (N = 203)	Resister (N = 138)
Slender	20	18	10
Medium	64	67	67
Heavy	16	15	22
Obese	0	0	1
No information (number of men)	(5)	(0)	(1)

hypotheses regarding the relationship between physique (and its personality correlates) and behavior in a prisoner-of-war setting. Additional analyses necessary to test such hypotheses were not pursued as part of this study in order that more attention might be given to data of greater immediate utility.

Post-Internment

The medical criteria used at induction for the designation of each soldier's "physical category" were again used upon repatriation in describing the physical status of the returning PW's. Here the results indicate that Resisters came out of internment in poorer physical condition than other PW's. More Resisters (32%) were classified in Physical Category B than either Participators (20%) or Middle Men (18%). Many additional items of information describing clinical findings at repatriation were available for study (e.g., chest X-ray and blood tests), but these were so detailed that it was considered useless to attempt to extract from them a definition of the specific disabilities which led to the physical classification of former PW's.

Medical Care in Captivity

The fact that Resisters were in poorer health than other PW's upon repatriation could be explained by the findings which indicated that this Group received greater pressures, including actual physical mistreatment, than their fellows. Data describing the medical facilities available to PW's in internment are also relevant.

The proportions of PW's in the three Groups to whom medical care was available are indicated in Table 22. In studying these data it should be kept in mind that from all indications the Resisters were in no less need of medical attention than other PW's during their internment; if anything—gauged by the prevalence among them of such diseases as dysentery, malaria, and pneumonia—the Resisters needed more care than others. Nevertheless, the Resisters reported that they received considerably less medical and surgical attention from their captors than did other PW's; Participators reported receiving the most care of all.

Table 22

AVAILABILITY OF MEDICAL CARE AMONG THREE PW GROUPS IN INTERNMENT
(per cent)

Care Available	Participators (N = 238)	Middle (N = 203)	Resisters (N = 135)
Medical and surgical care	64	58	38
Neither	19	16	19
Medical only	17	26	43
No information (number of men)	(15)	(9)	(3)

This finding is not unexpected in terms of the differential treatment accorded over all to cooperative and uncooperative PW's. Better medical care was a reward, an important aspect of the preferential treatment received by Participators; the neglect of Resisters in this regard was part of mistreatment and "punishment" meted out as reprisal for resistance behavior. Although there were periods in the early part of the Korean conflict when medical facilities were simply unavailable, it is noteworthy that over the entire internment experience 39 per cent of the Resisters report that they were denied medical attention when they asked for it; this is in contrast to 17 per cent of the Participators and 15 per cent of the Middle Men. In the environment of deprivation which characterized the Korean prison camps, the importance of medical care is not to be underestimated. The data indicate that the captor manipulated medical care as part of his system of rewards and punishments, and thus had available a potent inducement for collaborative activity.

Returning medical officers point out that many PW's could have done much more than they did toward caring for themselves and others. It is true that large numbers of PW's died soon after capture, especially those who were in a weakened and wounded condition and could not possibly have survived evacuation to the rear. But the repatriated PW physicians reported also that many PW's died needlessly during internment, after they demonstrated what the medical men called "give-up-itis," a consuming apathy and an unwillingness to practice even the rudiments of physical hygiene. In other words, many PW's died, according to the PW physicians, because they were no longer motivated to live. Such a setting—in which men showed a lack of concern not only for others, but for themselves—could only have enhanced the captor's chances for controlling the behavior of the PW's.

PSYCHOLOGICAL

Psychiatric diagnoses made upon repatriation were in terms of the gross categories reported in Table 23. Among all PW's 81 per cent were classified as being in good mental health, 9 per cent were termed psychoneurotics, 5 per cent were suffering from character and behavior disorders, and 3 per cent from transient personality disorders. Two

per cent were considered mentally deficient and one per cent psychotic. A higher proportion of men in the "good mental health" category is found among Resisters than among Participators.

A significant difference is also found when we compare the three Groups in terms of the psychiatric symptoms revealed in post-repatriation examination (see Table 23). The Resisters came out of

Table 23

PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSES AND SYMPTOMS AMONG THREE PW GROUPS

(per cent)

	Participators (N = 238)	Middle (N = 203)	Resisters (N = 138)
Diagnosis[a]			
Good mental health	76	82	84
Psychoneuroses	9	9	7
Character and behavior disorders	9	4	7
Transient personality disorders	4	3	2
Mental deficiency	1	2	0
Psychoses	1	1	0
Symptoms[a]			
None	61	70	77
Anxiety	28	19	18
Resentment	18	9	10
Apathy	12	9	4
Depression	6	6	4
Insomnia	3	2	4
Other	11	7	4
No information (number of men)	(5)	(0)	(1)

[a]Percentages total more than 100 % due to multiple responses.

internment with fewer symptoms than did the Participators. The Participators showed especially more anxiety than other PW's, although this may have been largely situational and a reflection of their concern over potential Army action to be taken toward them. From these data we cannot infer that there were any differences in psychopathology among the PW's. At most, the data indicate that the Resisters were repatriated in a "better frame of mind" than the Participators.

Chapter 11

THE MIDDLE GROUP

INTRODUCTION

The primary research mission of this study was, of course, to uncover and identify differences between PW's who participated with the captor and those who resisted him. For this reason little attention has been given thus far in this report to the Middle Group, especially to discussing variables which show the Middle Men to be truly "middle" (i.e., distributed between the two extremes). In a number of ways, however, the Middle Group appears to be unique, different from both Participators and Resisters. Although some of these characteristics have already been described, it will be useful to summarize them here so that a more complete picture of these PW's may be gained. The rationale for doing this is twofold: First, it should be recalled that 80 per cent of all PW's fell into this Group, so an understanding of them means an understanding of the large majority of repatriated prisoners of war; secondly, contrasting the Middle Group with both Participators and Resisters provides some additional insights into the behavior of men who took extreme positions toward the captor in Korea.

BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS

The Middle Group was found to differ from both Participators and Resisters in the following ways:

- Lower education level and, as would be expected, lower intelligence;
- More frequently from agricultural occupations and less frequently from white collar, professional, and student occupations;
- Less frequently married;
- Less frequently engaged in sports activities in civilian life and less frequently had entertainment talent;
- Lower rank;
- Less military experience and interned for a shorter period.

RELATIONSHIP WITH CAPTOR

Participation-Resistance

As far as their degree of participation with the captor was concerned, the Middle Group maintained, as the criterion grouping itself

implies, a middle-of-the-road course. Over all, they participated more than the Resisters and less than the Participators. But it is only by studying the frequency with which specific acts of participation and resistance were carried out that the nature of the Middle Men's behavior is clarified. With respect to acts of participation, the Middle PW's are like the Resister Group; they committed fewer than the Participators. With respect to acts of resistance, the Middle PW's are like the Participator Group; they performed fewer than the Resisters. What emerges is a picture of a Group which simply did less, in either direction.

Captor Response

When we study the Middle Group in terms of the two primary responses of the captor to prisoner behavior—preferential treatment on the one hand and pressure, or mistreatment, on the other—we find again that the Middle Men were unique. Like the Resisters, they received virtually no preferential treatment; like the Participators, they were the objects of relatively little pressure. Just as they did less, they got less, of either of the captor's "rewards." Parenthetically, the Middle Men considered personal, individual contacts as an effective indoctrination technique considerably less frequently than did other PW's. From all indications, the relationship between the Middle PW's and the captor was a more distant one than was the case with either Participators or Resisters.

RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER PW's

Was the Middle Group inactive only in relation to the captor, or does the same pattern hold as far as their relationships with other PW's are concerned? From the data available, it would appear that the latter is more nearly true. The Middle PW's joined organizations of any type, including "neutral" camp activity groups, less frequently than other PW's (see Figure 19). Quite apart from formal organizational affiliations, one of the rating scales used in this study defined the degree to which each PW "mixed" with others—whether he was more often alone



Figure 19

or in a group as far as his leisure time activities were concerned. Again the Middle Group is found to have been less prone to associate in groups than other PW's (Table 24).

Earlier it was pointed out that Middle Men were like the Resisters in that they felt hatred and contempt for Participators, but that, unlike the Resisters, Middle PW's did not take overt action against the "Progressives"; they did not act on their hostile attitudes and beat up Participators, as did the Resisters.

Table 24

ASSOCIATION WITH OTHER PW's AMONG THREE PW GROUPS

(per cent)

Association	Participators (N = 238)	Middle (N = 203)	Resisters (N = 138)
Mostly in group	23	13	29
Both group and alone	69	83	65
Mostly alone	8	4	6
No information (number of men)	(61)	(42)	(14)

Altogether, the picture of the Middle Men—in relation to the captor as well as to their fellows—is one of PW's who withdrew from the prison environment, who "blended with the scenery" more than either Resisters or Participators, and who came out of internment as see-ers, hearers, and speakers of less "evil" or "good" than their fellows. Somehow, one cannot help feeling that the Middle Man was the kind of soldier who would have said in basic training: "The best thing is not to volunteer for anything; don't let them become familiar with your name. That way you won't get called on for details. Act as if you weren't around."

We cannot, of course, be certain that the less intimate stance taken by the Middle PW's was consciously thought out, that is, that after due reflection they arrived at their position as the most comfortable adjustment they could make to prison life. Again, as in the case of Resisters and Participators, we have no way of knowing what judgments and decisions, if any, led to their pattern of behavior. From the very limited evidence available, however, there are at least some indications that the response of the Middle PW's to prison life was not altogether a new reaction to a unique situation, but that for these men withdrawal and anonymity, the tendency to blend with the crowd, were more natural than was the case with either Participators or Resisters. Available evidence would lead us to speculate that the behavior of the Middle Men was born out of personality factors more than situational ones.

SITUATIONAL AND PERSONALITY FACTORS

The single situational factor studied which differentiates the Middle Men from other PW's is the shorter duration of their internment. Prisoners in the Middle Group were captured later in the war, and were

therefore interned for a significantly shorter period than their fellows. The hypothesis that their shorter imprisonment itself enabled Middle Men to maintain an inactive role in prison camp is a reasonable one, but cannot be substantiated. It is true enough that the ratio of Middle to non-Middle PW's decreases when we compare PW's with increasingly longer periods in captivity. But this does not give us a longitudinal picture of behavior over time, and cannot therefore be taken to mean that a neutral PW found it increasingly more difficult to stay in the "middle" as time progressed. As a matter of fact, although comprehensive data describing the temporal sequence of behavior in internment are lacking in this study, there are numerous indications that participation and resistance behavior were not phenomena which crystallized only with the passage of time.

It must be remembered, too, that 87 per cent of all PW's were interned for over two years, and 57 per cent for more than 30 months; even for the Middle Group, over three-fourths spent more than two years in captivity, and almost half more than 30 months. The proportion of Middle Men who spent only a brief period in internment, while larger than that found among the remaining PW's, was still relatively small. Thus, the most that can be said regarding length of internment as a factor related to Middle Group behavior is that it was probably easier for a Middle Man to maintain his middle-of-the-road position if his period of captivity was of relatively short duration.

No direct assessments of personality factors were made for this study. There is some indirect evidence, however, from which it can be inferred that the Middle PW's were basically different from their fellows.

(1) From the background data we find that Middle Men were less active in sports and less often had entertainment talent than either Participators or Resisters. These are two activities which we would normally associate with the outgoing personality type. In this sense the Middle PW's appear to have been men relatively more withdrawn prior to military service. Perhaps of some significance also is the fact that Middle PW's were less frequently married than others, if we consider marriage as connoting a willingness to interact in close terms as a member of a social unit.

(2) It would be useful indeed to know in detailed fashion how the Middle Men viewed captivity, how they perceived the captor, and whether they felt more or less secure than other, newly taken prisoners. Only one item of information bears upon this factor, and for this item data are available for only one-fourth of the total sample. Based on these cases, we find that a significantly higher proportion of Middle Men reported feeling fear of the consequences of capture than was the case among the other two Groups. In their post-repatriation interviews three-fourths of the Middle Group mentioned that they had viewed captivity with fear; this is in contrast to 57 per cent of the Participators and 58 per cent of the Resisters who expressed similar feelings. A number of hypotheses may be proposed in elaboration of this finding: That the Resisters and Participators had already developed their attitudes of compliance and resistiveness and thus felt more secure in having a definitive position; or, that the Middle PW's, being newer in the Army,

found capture a more traumatic experience than their better-seasoned fellows. All this is, however, speculation. Taken by itself the finding simply suggests that more Middle PW's entered captivity with feelings of insecurity than did others, and this would not be incongruent with their tendency to withdraw from a threatening environment.

(3) Data gathered by means of routine psychological tests are being studied by the Walter Reed Graduate School, The Surgeon General's Office, as a means for comparing large numbers of PW's falling into very nearly the same criterion Groups as were utilized in this study. Although final conclusions from the Walter Reed study have not yet been reached, the data tend to differentiate Middle PW's from both of the extreme Groups in the following fashion: The Middle Group is found to be more passive, aloof, and withdrawn than other PW's. Both the Participators and Resisters were found to have higher scores than the Middle Men on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Scale measuring "psychopathic deviate" tendencies. Although psychopathic deviates are defined primarily as individuals who "get into trouble," it is also true that this behavioral pattern is an outgrowth of the tendency to act out conflicts, to come to grips in an overt fashion with situations that stir up threat and insecurity. It is merely a statistical fact that such individuals get into trouble with the law; more important—in terms of personality dynamics—is their relative inability to withdraw, to suppress, and inactivate themselves in relation to the environment about them. These preliminary findings suggest that the adjustment made by Middle Men to prison life was different from that of the extreme Groups, and was a reflection of their basic predisposition to suppress behavioral manifestations of internal conflict.

Taken together, the findings reported here would suggest the challenging hypothesis that Resisters and Participators—the minority among PW's—were basically not different from one another, that both tended to meet the threat of internment by acting out the conflicts aroused in them. We can, as a matter of fact, view both Participators and Resisters as "deviates" in a behavioral sense: Participators acted in ways which brought them into open conflict with the "laws" which govern our national security; Resisters acted in ways which brought them into conflict with the laws which governed the captor's program of exploitation. Neither met the conflict posed by these opposing forces through withdrawal and inactivation. In this sense, the Middle Group's response was no less "neurotic," but it was, perhaps, the response that most of us make to threats aroused when we interact with conflicting social forces.

RESEARCH NOTE

During the course of this study it became necessary, for administrative reasons, to curtail sharply the time that could be spent in analyzing the data collected. Certain of these data were not subjected even to the most superficial analyses and are therefore not mentioned in the body of this report. Other data, bearing on important factors, were not analyzed as exhaustively as they would have been had additional time been available. In the face of the urgency which surrounded the completion of this study, decisions were made as to what data and what analyses would best reveal results of the greatest utility to the Army. Considerations of time and utility were weighed together in determining the final content of this study.

The purpose here is not to describe the data omitted from this report, or to catalogue the additional analyses which could conceivably have been completed with the data on hand; to do so would involve a precise statement of tens of hypotheses and of the analytic means for testing them. Rather, it is important to record that, in the opinion of those associated with this research, the data for this study could serve as a basis not only for additional analyses of "academic" interest (i.e., those which would reveal facts of primarily socio-psychological interest), but also for analyses designed to reveal additional information of more immediate utility to the Army.

During the course of the project a record was kept of those analyses not pursued, and all of the data collected for this study are recorded on IBM punch cards in a form immediately accessible for further use. These materials could serve as the bases for considerable additional research on the prisoner-of-war problem.

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